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Chapter One: Institutional Legacies and the Evolution of Ethnic Conflict
Introduction
As ethnic conflict wreaks havoc on the Burmese state, Myanmar has captured
international attention. The state has unraveled since the military coup of last spring; rebel and
security forces have racked the streets with violence, with thousands of civilians killed in the
crossfire. This ethnic violence is painfully familiar in Myanmar. Since the colonial era, ethnicbased armed groups have been a distinctly enduring feature of Myanmar’s conflict landscape.
The Burmese state is controlled and defined by its ethnically exclusive nationalist military
regime. Ethnicity is inextricably linked to conflict; all of Myanmar’s seven major ethnic minority
groups have been linked to some form of insurgency—none have remained entirely passive or
have entirely assimilated to the Burmese majority. Many scholars suggest that the colonial
experience can explain the politicization and militarization of ethnicity, pointing to ethnic
favoritism, grievances, and weak postcolonial states unable to bring order to society. Myanmar
has an overwhelming history of divisive institutions, largely built during the British colonial
period and the Japanese occupation. These institutional legacies suggest that Myanmar’s ethnic
conflict is path-dependent, sustained by a self-reproductive system of violence. Yet, the nuanced
fragmentation and evolution of Burmese ethnic groups complicates a linear imagining of
conflict.
The complex interactions between ethnic minority groups and the Burmese government
have varied across time and space. Not all of Myanmar’s ethnic groups have played the same
role in challenging the government. Some have birthed particularly powerful insurgencies, while
others have been more amenable to negotiations with the central government, and experienced
significant ceasefire periods. Insurgent groups have also experienced ethnic defection, with
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splinter groups repurposed by the government as pro-state militia. What has driven the arc of
Myanmar’s ethnic conflict: British colonial institutions, Japanese wartime institutions, or some
other combination of political and social factors?
Predicated by both British colonialism and Japanese occupation during wartime,
Myanmar’s understudied and evolving conflict is a rich case study for examining the relationship
between institutional legacies and ethnic conflict. Still, Myanmar has largely been excluded from
contemporary conflict literature. I aim to bridge this “Burma Gap”, as Mathieson calls it.1 By
bringing theoretical perspectives into Burmese context, this thesis will not only contribute to a
greater conversation on colonialism, institutional legacies, and ethnic conflict; it will also stand
as a significant contribution to a limited body of contemporary scholarship on Myanmar.
Before continuing on to discuss the theoretical framework of my analysis, it is important
to establish a brief history of the British and Japanese in Myanmar. The British colonial period in
Myanmar lasted from 1824 to 1948. John Furnivall’s influential account of ethnic pluralism in
Myanmar—the striking “medley of peoples … living side by side, but separately”—suggests the
vastness of the ethnographic agenda attempted by the British.2 With waves of precolonial
immigration, mostly from India and China, the Burmese population was incredibly diverse. The
British attempt to organize society for production compelled the pacification of the Burmese
population. However, local interests were paid little attention, and internal security protected
British commerce above all else. The British constructed a shallow and extractive state in
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Myanmar, building institutions and bringing order without meaning.3 This “skinny state” was
“filled out with the coercive muscles of British and Indian army unites.”4 The British colonial
administration in Myanmar was constructed out of convenience—components of administration
in India were arbitrarily recreated in Myanmar, and the diverse society was haphazardly
reorganized. By selectively recruiting ethnic minorities into the colonial military, the British
established political alliances between certain groups, alliances that would ultimately bleed into
the Japanese occupation and World War II.
Many scholars trace ethnic conflict to colonial grievances and institutions that reified
ethnic boundaries. However, this is difficult in the case of Myanmar; tracing ethnic conflict
directly to British colonialism is impeded by the massive disruption that occurred during World
War II and the Japanese occupation. After the British departed, civil war simultaneously erupted.
As Callahan says:
The British colonial state disintegrated overnight, [and] there emerged a dizzying array of
nonstate organizations of violence, wherein coercion was the currency of politics and the
weakened state became only one of numerous entities with claims on violence, territory,
resources, and people.5
The Japanese invasion of Myanmar began in 1942. As the British colonial administration rapidly
collapsed, the Japanese scrambled to create wartime institutions. During this time period, the
Burmese state was overwhelmed by conflict with both international and civil dimensions. As
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interstate war pulled apart the British colonial administration, the Japanese cultivated new
domestic alliances along ethnic lines and constructed a new national military.
From the beginning of the colonial period to independence in 1948, complex institutional
legacies of ethnic division and militarization became rooted in the Burmese state. As conflict in
Myanmar continues to evolve, contemporary insurgency provides a new environment in which to
test theories of institutional legacy. While some insurgencies, like the Kachin Independence
Organization (KIO) have remained a formidable challenge to the Burmese state, others have
weakened over time. In the past three decades, there have been tenuous but significant shifts
toward cease-fire politics and cooperation with armed groups, suggesting that conflict dynamics
might be changing.6
Perhaps institutional legacies can explain the willingness of certain ethnic groups to
cooperate with the Burmese state. Or perhaps this slight shift in armed politics suggests that
situation at hand is a new dynamic, emerging from decades of strategic and situational behavior
taken by ethnic groups and the Burmese state. As the situation in Myanmar worsens, it is
important to identify the particular antecedents of this overwhelming ethnic violence. In this
thesis, I will examine whether Myanmar’s historical institutions created a path-dependent, selfperpetuating ethnic conflict. Broadly, this thesis aims to answer the question: how much do
institutional legacies matter when explaining ethnic conflict? In order to study the question at
hand, I will first examine the pre-existing literature on colonial legacies, wartime institution
building, and ethnic conflict.
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Literature Review
Before engaging with different theories of institutional legacy and ethnic conflict, it is
important to establish a general definition of institutions. As articulated by Helmke and Levitsky,
I will define institutions as the “rules and procedures (both formal and informal) that structure
social interaction by constraining and enabling actors’ behavior.”7 Most of my analysis will
examine formal institutions, such as systems of political representation, policing, and the
military.
To test the relationship between institutions and ethnic conflict, I will examine three areas
of literature. First, I will draw on literature that emphasizes colonial legacies, in order to frame
my analysis of the British colonial period. Colonial legacies have been widely studied and linked
to ethnic conflict and state weakness. Next, I will examine what I call “competing legacies”
arguments. These arguments describe wartime institution building, which, in the case of
Myanmar, might have “competed” with the legacy of British colonial institutions. Finally, I will
examine what I call “situational and strategic arguments,” which deemphasize institutional
legacies by highlighting the fluid and complex dynamics of civil conflict and the strategic ways
in which insurgents and governmental actors respond to political and social context.

Colonial Legacies
I will begin by considering literature that emphasizes the long-term effects of
colonialism, including the political legacies of state capacity, colonial institutions, and ethnic
conflict. Jeffrey Herbst famously argued that colonial rule exacerbated underlying structural

Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky. “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda.”
Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 04 (2004): 725-40. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472.
7
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constraints in Africa, making it even harder for postcolonial rulers to exert power.8 In Africa,
colonial rule established artificial state boundaries and failed to establish meaningful institutions.
With difficulty governing over vast colonial territories, colonial rulers did not implement an
effective system of governance. This led to postcolonial states that were unable to extend their
power outside of colonial hubs: capitals and coastal cities. The incapacity of many modern
African states reflects the failure of colonial rulers to establish effective governance and develop
state institutions. Herbst’s explanation of state failure in Africa builds on a tradition of work that
evaluates the development of states as modern institutions. The modern state is characterized by
its bureaucracies, fiscal systems, and representative institutions.9 Institutional development that
was manipulated and perverted by colonial powers can explain the weakness of many modern
states.
In Lineages of Despotism and Development, Lange challenges the widespread belief that
past imperialism necessarily hinders the development of nations.10 In his analysis of all British
colonies, Lange distinguishes between direct and indirect rule as two fundamentally different
systems of control, with very different legacies. While direct rule was transformative and
intensive, indirect rule was a form of colonial domination, in which colonial administrators
collaborated with indigenous intermediaries. Lange determines that more intensive, direct rule
supports the development of a strong state with high levels of bureaucratization. Contrastingly,
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indirect rule created weak, patrimonial states. Interestingly, Myanmar is an outlier among
Lange’s case studies. In Myanmar, the British used a combination of direct and indirect rule, but
the former predominated.11 Given the degree of direct rule, Lange’s theory predicts a much
higher developmental record than actually observed in Myanmar, which is one of Asia’s poorest
countries, with an incredibly ineffective and weak state. The failure of Lange’s theory in this
case demonstrates the importance of attention to the Japanese occupation in Myanmar.
Kohli similarly argues that intensive colonialism can have a beneficial long-term legacy.
Japanese colonial policies ultimately supported the development of a strong and prosperous
postcolonial Korean state.12 Prior to colonialism, Korea was a weak state, which would have
been unable to successfully modernize on its own. Even though Japanese colonial policies were
highly repressive and violent, they strengthened Korea’s postcolonial state in three ways: 1) they
contributed to the development of a powerful colonial bureaucracy, 2) they supported the
construction of an alliance between state and capital, and 3) the strengthened the development of
institutions of mass repression. Ultimately, this legacy supported Korean industrialization and
the growth of a capable state. Kohli is one of few scholars that emphasizes a positive colonial
impact, but his argument fundamentally supports the same idea as Herbst and others: the colonial
experience is defining for a state. Furthermore, his attention to institutions of mass repression
reveals the importance of coercive colonial power.
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In addition to determining state capacity and strength, colonial rule leaves behind a
profound legacy of ethnic conflict. In Citizen and Subject, Mahmood Mamdani traces the
politicization of ethnicity to the colonial state. Mamdani argues that the British regime in Africa
constructed despotic and hierarchical state, through which ethnicity was made political. The
British designed a bifurcated state that ordered society through divisive institutions, separating
the rural from the urban, and one ethnicity from another.13 Under the British, indirect rule came
to be the mode of domination over the native people. This indirect rule reinforced ethnically
bound institutions of control—every local apparatus was organized around an ethnic or religious
basis. Thus, ethnic and tribal identity became much more rigid, and a preeminent concern.
“Ethnicity (tribalism) thus came to be simultaneously the form of colonial control over natives
and the form of revolt against it.”14 Mamdani shows that contemporary ethnic conflict in Africa
is a product of this indirect rule and its institutional legacies. When colonial powers use ethnic
identity as the basis of their resource allocation, political organization, and institutional control,
ethnicity becomes deeply politicized.
In The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Violence in India, Ajay Verghese emphasizes the roles
that institutions play in maintaining colonial legacies of ethnic division. In India, different
policies of ethnic stratification, both from British and princely India, created “disparate fault
lines of conflict.” These fault lines persist because of institutions—both formal institutions such
as parties and schooling, and institutions as informal as the memories of an ethnic community.
Throughout my thesis, I draw on this concept of “fault lines of conflict” to describe the ways in
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which institutions make patterns of ethnic violence highly durable.15 Verghese shows that
patterns of ethnic violence tend to harden over time, especially when reinforced by institutions.
Thus, ethnic violence is one realm in which identities are unlikely to change. Similarly,
Lieberman and Singh study the British census in India, systematically testing the relationship
between state institutions and ethnic salience. Lieberman and Singh argue that by solidifying
boundaries between social identities and enumerating ethnic cleavages, the institution of the
census creates ethnic categories and conflict.16 By elevating ideas of “otherness” and ethnic
competition, institutions can place ethnic identity at the forefront of politics.
Colonial legacies drive state weakness and the continued politicization of ethnic identity,
factors instrumental in understanding contemporary ethnic violence. By defining “fault lines of
conflict,” the colonial period can leave behind an institutional legacy that continuously
reproduces conflict along the same ethnic lines. The literature on colonialism frames my first
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: British colonialism established “fault lines” of conflict, determining the
course of ethnic conflict in Myanmar.

Competing Legacies
The phenomenon of colonialism has been so widely studied because of the mass
disruption it brings to both state and society, birthing new institutions. Yet, British colonization
was not the only (and perhaps not even the greatest) disruption of the Burmese state. Myanmar’s
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dramatic decolonization—in which the state was launched from colonial rule into World War II
and Japanese occupation—has been widely understudied. Many scholars have discussed
colonialism and its legacies, but few have traced the exact legacies of decolonization and
wartime institutions, leaving a substantial gap in current literature. I will frame this gap by
drawing on scholarship that describes the window of opportunity for institution building that is
created during decolonization and wartime. As the British colonial administration collapsed, this
window of opportunity supported the development of new institutions in Myanmar. Thus, I will
examine the possibility of “competing legacies,” which might have overwhelmed the influence
of the British colonial period.
Decolonization is a quite technical term for what is an incredibly dramatic process. As
the imperial state dissolves and its rule is delegitimized, a nation-state emerges. Though
dramatic, decolonization is not a short process, the colonizers hardly “vanish into the night.”
Decolonization is a complicated, a drawn-out process of disentanglement and reentanglement,
enmeshed in other political and social changes—in the case of Myanmar, this was World War
II.17
Myanmar emerged from its colonial statehood into a complex wartime with both
international and civil dynamics, as different military alliance fractionalized society. Literature
has generally identified key differences between the influences of interstate and civil war, and so
I will consider arguments that address institution building during both kinds of war. Scholars
have long studied the relationship between interstate war making and state making. Classical
bellicist theory frames an understanding of wartime, best summarized in Tilly’s famous
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aphorism “war made the state, and the state made war.”18 Tilly argues that wartime competition
over territory and resources facilitated the development of the state. He identifies three primary
ways in which war supports the growth of a strong state. First, war making helped rulers
concentrate coercive power and eliminate domestic rivals. Second, war making led to the
development of state institutions to extract resources and support the war, such as through
taxation. Finally, the state developed its capacity for protection, through institutions like courts
of law, in order to promote the accumulation of capital and resources that might be accessed by
the state. By achieving these different functions integral to war, the state emerges. If war is, as
bellicist theory argues, a defining period for the state, it is imperative to study Myanmar during
World War II and the institutions built by the Japanese.
Bellicist theory emerged in the context of European states, and thus has been criticized in
its general application. It must be carefully considered in the case of Myanmar. In Blood and
Debt, Miguel Centeno challenges the universal application of bellicist theory and rejects the
application of Tilly’s logic to Latin American states.19Though Centeno does not entirely reject
Tilly’s argument, he significantly complicates it. Centeno argues that the historical context of
war determines its state making capacity, rather than this being some benefit inherent in all wars.
The European states that Tilly considered already had a basic organizational capacity that Latin
American states lacked. Access to external financing further undermined the statebuilding
process in Latin America, creating bankrupt beggar states.20 Centeno finds that Latin American

Charles Tilly. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making”. Formation of National States in Western
Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, 42.
18
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State University Press, 2003.
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wars occurred two soon after independence and thus the state could not respond in the pattern
described by Tilly. Centeno’s challenge to bellicism might explain elements of Myanmar’s state
failure. Emerging directly from colonial rule into wartime, the state hardly had the opportunity to
develop organizational capacity, or to even exist without external support and control.
Research into the effects of intrastate war further complicates the possibilities of wartime
institutional legacies. Generally, findings on the subject of civil war are quite mixed. While some
scholars find that civil war harms a state’s capacity for extractive processes like taxation, others
find that internal conflict can bolster state extraction. In “Civil War, Institutional Change, and
Criminalization of the State,” Rachel Schwartz takes a novel approach to studying civil war,
institutional change, and revenue extraction.21 Rather than focusing on sweeping processes such
as statebuilding or destruction, Schwartz emphasizes the smaller, more specific rules and
changes that develop during civil war. She shows that civil war can induce extractive weakness
because of the specific institutions, rules, and procedures created during civil conflict, which are
different from those created during interstate conflict. During civil conflict, escalating insurgent
threats generate institutional ambiguity, producing “soft spots” in the state’s fiscal order and
prompting change.22 During civil conflict, new rules are formed, which might either strengthen
or undermine the state.
Schwartz identifies two institutional logics that guide the new rules made during civil
conflict; the rules “may be undermining and thus deviate from the state’s extractive functions or

Rachel Schwartz. “Civil War, Institutional Change, and the Criminalization of the State: Evidence from
Guatemala’s Conflict Archives.” Journal of Peace Research 55(2): 222-235.
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16
reinforcing and thus coincide with them.”23 Undermining rules are formed when escalating
insurgent threats empower political military actors. In order to avoid insurgent penetration, this
counterinsurgent elite becomes insulated from broader political and military structures. The
expansion of military control, outside of non-military institutional arenas, obstructs internal
regime opposition and civilian oversight, concentrating authority in a small body of
counterinsurgent elites. Thus, rules are narrowly conceived and feed benefits directly to a small,
military elite, explaining why wartime institutions can undermine the state. Schwartz argues that
reinforcing rules are created when a “broader, multisectoral rule-making coalition takes place.”24
In this situation, the escalation of an insurgent threat similarly produces institutional ambiguity,
but it causes state leaders to collaborate in a diverse coalition. This leads to a deliberative
rulemaking process that incorporates different interests, leading to rules that reinforce the state.
Thus, Schwartz contends that divergent paths of wartime institutional development can be
explained through the elite groups that shape institutional change, and the exact rules that
emerge. Schwartz’s analysis suggests that postcolonial war might birth an entirely new
institutional system. Furthermore, she demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the
Burmese military elite that emerged during World War II.
Classical bellicist theory and literature on civil war both show that wartime produces
institutional ambiguity, creating an opportunity for overwhelming institutional growth and
change. Even if British colonialism temporarily redefined the Burmese state, literature frames the
possibility of “competing legacies,” which might have overwhelmed any changes made by the
British. Did the process of decolonization during wartime and Japanese occupation overwrite the
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British colonial legacy, defining new fault lines of conflict? Theories of institution building
during interstate and civil war provide a foundation for my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Massive wartime disruption cast new institutional legacies that
overwhelmed the British colonial legacy, determining Myanmar’s ethnic conflict.

Situation and Strategy
A separate area of scholarship draws attention to the behavioral and group centric
elements of conflict, emphasizing situational and strategic reasons for rebellion, fragmentation,
and cooperation. These theories would deemphasize the institutional legacies of British
colonialism, Japanese occupation, and wartime, and draw attention instead to the specific
environment in which Burmese ethnic conflict occurs, and the evolving dynamics between the
insurgents and the state.
Paul Staniland posits that many scholars make a fundamentally flawed assumption that
both sides of a civil conflict are “locked in a straightforward struggle for a monopoly of
violence.”25 This assumption overlooks the variance of political orders during civil war, such as
the temporary emergence of cooperation between the state and its ostensible rivals. During war,
political orders are likely to develop, evolve, and collapse in complex oscillations.
In Ordering Violence, Staniland focuses on the role of that the government plays in
defining and responding to insurgency, and how this shapes conflict dynamics. His fundamental
claim is that the government’s response to insurgency is driven by its perception of ideological
threat. Rather than directly worrying about the size or power of an armed group, the regime

Paul Staniland. “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders.” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 2 (2012): 24364, 243.
25
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assesses how a group’s politics align with the government’s own goals.26 Staniland uses
Myanmar as a case study and identifies Burmese nationalism as being definitive of the wartime
political order. By establishing Burman ethnicity and Buddhist religion as the top of the
hierarchy, the Burmese nationalist project laid a foundation for ongoing political conflict.
Staniland contends that ethnic, religious, and linguistic political cleavages had elements of
fluidity in the 1940s and 50s but dramatically hardened under General Ne Win’s military
dictatorship, beginning in 1962.27 By emphasizing the fluidity of ethnicity prior to General Ne
Win’s dictatorship, Staniland suggests that neither the British colonial period, nor the Japanese
occupation, established fault lines of conflict. Instead, the nationalist ideology of the Burmese
government supports ethnic conflict, by driving heavily repressive security responses and
preventing cooperation with minority groups.28 Staniland’s argument emphasizes the goals of the
postcolonial regime and the role they play in defining and fueling insurgency. Therefore, we
should not assume that wartime and colonial era legacies of conflict will persist, as postcolonial
states have the capacity to reshape conflict through their own ideologies and interests.
While Staniland focuses on the goals of the regime, Kalyvas focuses on the conflict
dynamic itself, and how this dynamic generates changing patterns of compliance and resistance.
Kalyvas emphasizes fluidity in civil conflict, describing civil wars as dynamic social and
political contexts.29 He says that civil conflict can shape the behavioral expression of ethnic
identity in many ways, rather than just hardening and solidifying ethnic identity, as Verghese
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suggests. Kalyvas draws on constructivist theory, which explains ethnicity as a socially
constructed identity that evolves through interactions with other actors. He argues that the
behavioral potential of ethnicity is empirically variable. Kalyvas specifically examines two
processes: identity shift, the acquisition of a new ethnic or national identity that replaces the old,
and ethnic defection, in which individuals join organizations “explicitly opposed to the national
aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up fighting against their
coethnics.”30 Kalyvas’ evaluation of ethnic defection might lend insight into the ethnic armed
groups that have willingly been transformed into pro state militia. According to Kalyvas, features
such as resources and territorial control influence ethnic defection, shaping the arc of ethnic
conflict. Kalyvas presents both theoretical and empirical findings that demonstrate the fluidity of
ethnic identity and the importance of postcolonial dynamics, demonstrating the importance of
investigating later variance in Myanmar’s ethnic conflict.
Arguments that emphasize the responsiveness of conflict actors to a changing political
context frame my third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Ethnic conflict in Myanmar has not been determined by institutional
legacies; political and social factors have shaped the behaviors of conflict actors, driving
the evolution of ethnic conflict.

Methodology
Using Myanmar as a single case study, this thesis seeks to understand the role of
institutional legacies in ethnic conflict and examines the inherent tensions between the concept
of path dependency and the concept of a fluid and evolving ethnic conflict. An exclusive focus
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on Myanmar supports country specific analysis and comparison, and I analyze both scholarly and
primary sources for my research. I compare institution building between two distinct periods,
British colonialism, and Japanese occupation, in order to disentangle Myanmar’s institutional
legacies. I also compare Burmese ethnic groups, and the ways in which their ethnic identities
have been made political and violent. My outcome of interest is the politicization and potential
militarization of ethnic identity, that is, the extent to which groups have engaged in ethnic
competition. I draw on Lieberman and Singh’s definition of ethnic competition, as a “pattern of
behavior in which ordinary citizens and elites consistently engage in contests over foods,
services, prestige, and leadership, such that the winners and losers are generally described by
participants and close observers in terms of ethnic groups.”31 Ethnic conflict is an extreme
manifestation of ethnic competition, and ethnic violence an extreme form of ethnic conflict. In
this thesis, I will examine ethnic competition as it takes shape during the colonial period,
escalates in the nationalist movement, and erupts in ethnically defined insurgencies.
As previously described, my paper will test three different hypotheses. 1) British
colonialism established “fault lines” of conflict, determining the course of ethnic conflict in
Myanmar. 2) Massive wartime disruption replaced colonial institutions, casting new legacies
which better explain Myanmar’s ethnic conflict. 3) Ethnic conflict in Myanmar has not been
determined by institutional legacies; political and social factors have shaped the behaviors of
conflict actors, driving the evolution of ethnic conflict.
Myanmar is incredibly diverse, with seven major ethnic minority groups and many
smaller immigrant groups. For the purpose of this thesis, I have narrowed my focus to studying
the politicization or militarization of identity in four different ethnic groups. By referencing each

Evan S. Lieberman, and Prerna Singh. “Census Enumeration and Group Conflict: A Global Analysis of the
Consequences of Counting.” World Politics 69, no. 1 (2017): 1–53. doi:10.1017/S0043887116000198. 8.
31
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of these four groups throughout my thesis, I will show how they have been differently
incorporated into institutions and involved in ethnic conflict. First, I will consider the ethnic
Burmans, the majority group in Myanmar. I have also selected three ethnic minority groups for
comparison: the Karen, Kachin, and the Mon.
By selecting these three groups, I capture some of the variation that can be observed in
Myanmar’s enduring civil conflict. The violent conflict between the Karens and ethnic Burmans
is the longest running and most consistent conflict in Myanmar, beginning even before the
colonial period. Under British rule, the Karens received political privileges, but under the
Japanese occupation this power dynamic was subverted, and the Karens were subjugated. The
Karens represent the most extreme case of an ethnic identity being politicized and militarized.
The Karens rebelled against the Burmese government immediately after Myanmar gained
political independence in 1948 and did not partake in a successful ceasefire agreement until
2012.32 The Kachins, the second group selected for study, are notably distinct in their geographic
stronghold in Myanmar’s southern hills.33 Throughout the colonial period and the Japanese
occupation, the Kachins enjoyed significant political autonomy, as it was difficult to exert
control over these southern borderlands. Unlike with the Karen, Kachin insurgency did not begin
until a decade after Myanmar’s political independence, and the Kachin were amenable to
ceasefire negotiations in 1995 (though this ceasefire ultimately failed). Lastly, the Mons are
distinct from both the Karens and Kachins, in that they have a significant history of assimilation
to the Burman majority. Throughout the colonial period and the Japanese occupation, Mon
identity appeared relatively unpolitical. Thus, it seems surprising that the Mons rebelled even

32

Dukalskis, “Why Do Some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires While Others Do Not?” 21.

33

Lintner, Burma in Revolt, 48.

22
before the Kachin, only a year after the Karens first rebelled. The Mons also engaged in early
ceasefire negotiations, and today, Mon insurgents are the least active.34 By selecting these three
ethnic groups for study, I can contrast their distinct experiences under the British and Japanese
and compare inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic variance in behavior throughout Myanmar’s political
history.
This thesis will not only investigate the variation across groups, that is, why some
ethnicities are more politicized or militarized, but also variation within groups: why they have
acted in different ways at different times, sometimes assimilating, then rebelling, then
cooperating with the central state. To interpret these behaviors, I draw on the two approaches to
theorizing ethnic conflict described above: arguments that emphasize institutional legacies, and
arguments that emphasize situation and strategy in explaining group behaviors throughout
wartime. The historical scope of this thesis is large, spanning from the colonial period to present
day ethnic conflict. As each chapter moves forward in history, I will continuously evaluate the
duration, strength, and influence of the institutions I have selected for study, in order to see how
they have politicized and militarized different ethnicities, and in order to test the concept of pathdependency.

Analysis to Come
In tracing the origins of Myanmar’s persistent ethnic conflict, I will pull apart the
institutional legacies of the British colonial period and the Japanese occupation during wartime.
In further analysis I will test the duration of any institutional legacies and examine their potential
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for explaining the variance in the behavioral expression of ethnic identity, compared to theories
of conflict that emphasize situational and strategic behaviors.
The thesis will continue as follows. The second chapter will examine the institutions built
during the British colonial period and conclude with an initial evaluation of the British colonial
legacy and its impact on ethnic conflict. The third chapter will focus on the institutions built
during Japanese occupation and World War II, in order to determine whether this period
“overwrote” the legacies of the colonial period. The cumulative argument of chapters two and
three is that the British established fault lines of conflict, which were reinforced, not rewritten,
by the Japanese. Ultimately, the British and Japanese periods were crystallized in one key
institutional legacy: Myanmar’s ethnically exclusive military. The fourth chapter will examine
the evolution of ethnic conflict post-independence, including changes in the past two decades. I
will challenge the possibility of path-dependency by considering explanations that emphasize the
situational and strategic elements of conflict. In my fifth and final chapter, I will evaluate my
findings and present a historical theory of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, which is grounded
conceptually in the institutional fault lines of conflict.
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Chapter Two: British Burma
Introduction
Ethnic conflict has often been traced to colonial grievances institutions that solidified
ethnic boundaries. In precolonial Myanmar, ethnicity was fundamentally fluid and regionally
based—it was not fundamentally political, nor was it militarized. Under British colonial rule,
ethnic boundaries were solidified and made political salient. Through institutions of indirect rule,
the military apparatus, and the tolerance of ethnically based local armies, the colonial period
created lasting ethnic divisions. This chapter establishes an overview of precolonial Myanmar
and then examines the ways in which the British rulers created lasting fault lines of conflict. I
show that the colonial period was institutionally transformative and a fundamental cause of
ethnic conflict in Myanmar.

Precolonial Myanmar
Before examining the British colonial period, it is important to establish a brief overview
of precolonial society in Myanmar. The precolonial period spans from 1587 to 1885, when the
monarchical order and Buddhist state fell to the British empire. This expansive period was not
one long unchanging pattern, but for the sake of reference and comparison, I will establish a
general description of the precolonial state and society. Fundamentally, the precolonial state was
patrimonial.35 Yet, while the state was organized hierarchically, there was a constant tension
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between the center and its extremities.36 In theory, the king was a universal monarch, carefully
regulating the kingdom and bestowing order on the populace. In reality, the monarch was
entangled in a web of threats and internal rivalries, as he sought tenuous control over an
incredibly diverse and rural state.37 The authority of the monarch and central institutions came
largely from patron-client ties and religious legitimacy, rather than from institutional strength.
The military exemplifies these precolonial patterns of political organization. Without any clear
command structure or rational organization, military order was often sustained through
patronage; gift-giving and other incentives swayed both commanders and their units.38
Ultimately, patron-client ties sustained a precolonial state that could not exert complete control
over its diverse and rural extremities.
The legitimacy of the precolonial state was firmly grounded in religious doctrine and
customary beliefs.39 While the ideology of Myanmar’s classical kingship had many elements, it
was deeply intertwined with Buddhism, and engrained in its population the belief that political
order was inevitable and cosmological. While Buddhism was a legitimizing force, which
bolstered the state and also supported cultural unity in central Myanmar, powerful religious
institutions sometimes threatened state control.40 The Buddhist Sangha, or monkhood, grew
stronger where the state was weak, and the growth of autonomous religious power regularly
raised alarm. Throughout the precolonial period, the power of both the Sangha and the central
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state waxed and waned.41 The tension between the two, along with monarchal attempts to reform
the Sangha, continued until British colonization, which would severely undermine the power of
the Sangha. In the precolonial period, Buddhism played a fundamental role in ordering the state
and organizing society. In Myanmar, precolonial political culture was fluid and religiously
based. There was no strong sense of national unity.42
Burmese society lacked “the social and cultural bonding of a settled, integrated political
unit or nation.”43 With waves of precolonial immigration, mostly from India and China, the
Burmese population was composed of at least eight major ethnic groups with many smaller
groups. Society was divided along ethnic lines; people identified with their ethnic groups, rather
than sharing some national identity under the rule of the Burman kings.44 Daily life was
organized on a cellular level. While ethnic identity in the precolonial period was messy and
complex, each of the four ethnic groups studied in this paper had a distinct precolonial
experience.
The map below (Figure 1) depicts Myanmar’s immense ethnic diversity, including the
Chins, Kayas, Shans, and Rakhines, which are not studied in this thesis. Importantly, this map
visualizes the distribution of major ethnic groups, including the Burmans, Kachin, and Karen.
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Figure 1. Map of Myanmar and Ethnic Distribution 45
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First, it is important to note on this map, the term “Burmese” is used to describe the
ethnic Burman majority. Throughout history, the terms Burman and Burmese have sometimes
been used interchangeably to refer to the ethnic majority. However, the term “Burmese” is also
used to describe the Burmese state, society, and all other native peoples in Myanmar. In my own
analysis, I exclusively use the term Burman when referring to the ethnic majority, for the sake of
clarity. It is also important to recognize that Mons are not represented at all in this map. This is
not because the Mon population is so insignificant, but because the Mons have not any
meaningful geographic stronghold since the 1600s. For centuries, the Mons have lived as a small
minority group, almost entirely interspersed among the ethnic Burmans in central Myanmar.46
The Burmans dominated central Myanmar. In some areas, the Karens were interspersed with the
Burmans, but the Karens also dwelled in territory extending far north along the Thailand border.
The Kachins were distinctly concentrated in the southern hills of Myanmar.
In the early pre-colonial period, the most significant ethnic cleavage was between the
Mons, a small ethnic minority group, and the Burmans, the ethnic majority. The Mons were a
relatively small ethnic group—in 1931, the Mon population was estimated to be 337,728,
compared to over 9,000,000 Burmans.47 The territory that would eventually compose modernday Myanmar contained two kingdoms: the northern Avan kingdom, dominated by Burmans,
and the southern Peguan kingdom, dominated by Mons. The Burmese and Mon languages were
mutually unintelligible, belonging to different linguistic families, and the two groups had distinct
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cultural practices and ways of dressing.48 However, these identities were not entirely static or
mutually exclusive. To an extent “’Mon’ was a role filled by people loyal to Pegu, while
‘Burman’ was the role accepted by people loyal to Ava. Some Pegu dwelling Burmans
assimilated, as did some Mons in Ava. For example, an ethnic Burman living in Ava might cut
his hair in a Mon fashion and identify as ‘Mon,’ while still maintaining some Burman cultural
traits.49 While much literature on pre-colonial Myanmar treats the principal ethnic groups as
discrete historical categories, these ethnic groups were not entirely exclusive and stable.50
The precolonial history of the Mons has long been shrouded in myth. Virtually all
interpretations of Mon history have been dominated by the belief that a powerful Mon Kingdom
flourished until it was conquered by the Burmans. In many accounts, the Mons have been
regarded as acting as massive cultural donors to the ethnic Burmans.51 In a compelling dissection
of this “Mon paradigm,” Michael Aung-Thwin identifies much of this “history” as mythology
that originated in the 15th century, when Mon King Dhammazedi, eager to establish prestige for
the Mon polity, claimed the kingdom to be the earliest site of Buddhist orthodoxy. 52 This myth
would later be amplified by the British, as a tool of ethnic division. Ultimately, the Mon
precolonial experience is defined by 1) the pervasive mythologization of early Mon influence
and 2) the fact that the Mons, in the later precolonial period, were clearly under Burman rule.
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Even before British annexation, the Mons were a subject people.53 By the end of the precolonial
period, the ethnic Burmans were clearly established as the ruling class. The Mons were, in some
ways, subjugated due to their distinct language and culture. However, throughout the later
precolonial period, geographic proximity resulted in notable assimilation and intermarriage
between the Mons and the Burmans.
As the dominant, and largest, indigenous group, the Burmans forced proximate ethnic
groups into subordinacy over time. Many Burmans resided in Upper and Lower Myanmar,
working as farmers in river valleys and plains. The Karen, the largest indigenous minority group,
similarly dwelled in areas of Lower Myanmar and parts of Upper Myanmar. The Karens suffered
greatly at the hands of the Burmans—they were considered inferior, widely mistreated, subjected
to raids, and forced into labor by the ethnic majority.54 The Karens made up a large part of the
indigenous population—in 1930, the Karen population was approximately 1,367,673.55
However, they were not incorporated into the precolonial government. Many Karens, hoping to
escape subjugation, made homes in rural and mountainous land. 56
In the early nineteenth century, American missionaries found their way to these rural
Karen settlements. Though most Karens are now Buddhist, missionary schooling and Christian
conversion would support British collaboration with the Karen.57 Christian influence came to
distinguish the Karen from the other ethnic groups, including the Mon, that supported the British
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during early annexation.58 Moscotti notes that to a large extent, missionaries slowed the
‘Burmanization’ or assimilation of the Karens to the ethnic majority.59 Christian missionaries
encouraged a Karen identity that was separate from the precolonial state and “connected
ideologically and personally with the growing power of the Western world.”60 The colonial state
would continue to nurture this identity.
The final ethnic minority group studied in this paper, the Kachins, arrived to the territory
that would eventually compose modern-day Myanmar late in the precolonial period. Thus,
compared to the Karen and Mon minorities, there is little written about Kachin precolonial
history. Kachin migration from southern China and eastern Tibet to Myanmar was still ongoing
when the British arrived in the early twentieth century, and thus, the Kachins had not been firmly
situated within the precolonial political landscape.61
Despite immense ethnic diversity, ethnicity was not the dominant mode of precolonial
political organization.62 There were ethnic divisions in precolonial society, as well as ethnically
based conflicts—notably between Karens and Burmans. However, these ethnic divisions did not
define the Burmese state. Ethnic identity was not entirely cohesive, so while it might have been
politicized in some cases, it was not in others. In the eighteenth century, rebellion sometimes
arose among discontent minority groups, but universalist traditions mitigated ethnic
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exclusiveness. During the Peguan (Mon) revolt against the Burman monarchy, many selfidentified Burmans supported the Mon.63 Ethnic identity was just one of several factors that
determined political loyalty in the precolonial period.
These ethnic identities would only begin to take on a more precise, exclusive meaning,
under colonial imposition. During the precolonial period, the correlation between ethnic identity
and political loyalty was imperfect and complicated. It is important to note that the categories
‘Burman,’ ‘Mon,’ ‘Karen,’ and ‘Kachin’ were malleable throughout this expansive period, and,
at times, encapsulated or intersected with other identities that go unmentioned here. Myanmar’s
population was divided by geography and regionalism, and thus groups that enjoyed the same
language and culture were fragmented. Precolonial conflicts and allegiances were sometimes
produced along ethnic lines, as in the case of Karen subjugation. However, the patrimonial state
organized society through personal, almost quasi-feudal allegiances, which were not based in
ethnic or cultural distinctions.64 It is not until after the fall of the monarchical state that was
ethnic conflict was linked inextricably to Burmese politics.

The Colonial State
Invasion and Early Ethnic Politics
The British gradually took over Burmese territory in three Anglo-Burmese wars,
beginning in 1824 and concluding in 1886. These wars were not waged with any coherent,
expansionist vision of “British Burma,” rather they were prompted by competition between
France and Britain over the natural resources in Southeast Asia. Even early in the precolonial

63

Lieberman, “Ethnic Politics,” 480.

64

Lieberman, 480.

33
period, British interference in ethnic relations was apparent, as invaders took advantage of the
Christian converted Karens. One officer in the British army commented that the Karen, owing to
the missionaries’ activities “are often better educated than the Burmans … and they have been
taught how to cooperate.”65 The British found willing Karen guides, who were praised for their
service after the war.66 The Mons were also largely cooperative with the British during the war.
The British explained both Mon and Karen cooperation in terms of ethnic antagonism by the
Burmans. It is claimed that these groups viewed the British as liberators from Burman rule.67
Seeking a pool of reliable recruits for state service, the British began to subvert the internal
balance of power, establishing their preference for ethnic minority groups, over the ethnic
majority.
Racism and anti-Burman sentiment was powerful within the colonial administration.
Writing in 1882, Sir James George Scott reiterates fundamental stereotypes about the Burmans:
they were lazy, they were violent and prone to criminal behavior, and they were indifferent to
British rule.68 Scott describes them as “lamentably wanting in self-control, sometimes passing
into wild outbursts of brutality.”69 The British considered the Burmans distant and untrustworthy,
and imagined them the “sad bully” of the Burmese population. The Karen, who were
increasingly well regarded by the British, reinforced this image of the Burman people as the
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great antagonist. As the British constructed the colonial state, their sharp preferences for certain
ethnic minority groups were institutionalized.

Colonial Administrative Order
The British state in Myanmar was never an imperial priority; it was established as an
appendage to India and a buffer zone between French Indochina and India.70 The colonial
government constructed a shallow and extractive state, repurposing many components of the
British administration in India. The British were singularly focused on ordering society so that it
might best access resources.71 The goal of the administration was to meet a basic standard of
order at a minimum inconvenience, with annexed territories that were able to raise sufficient
revenue to fund themselves. Well-practiced in strategies of colonial subjugation and
administration in India, the British-Indian state hit the ground running in Myanmar, ready to
establish law and order, in order to expand business and take advantage of a wealth of
resources.72 Over time, the immediate concerns of the British administration, efficiency and
social order, became increasingly difficult to achieve, as the indigenous social structure
disintegrated. As economic activity simultaneously intensified, the British policy in Myanmar
became less laissez faire. Therefore, while British Burma was for its duration a weak and
shallow state, the colonial administration did significantly expand over time.
When comparing the precolonial state to the colonial state, the most obvious contrast is
the degree of formal centralization. Following the Indian prototype, the British instituted a
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system of “gradationary control,” in which authority was exercised through a clearly defined
chain of officials, down to the village level. The colonial state aimed to comprehensively
intervene in society.73 Subordinate officials of the central government involved themselves
directly in the lives of peasantry.74
A combination of direct and indirect rule—in which some areas were directly ruled by
the British, but other regions were left under the control of precolonial rulers—was a system
imported from India and implemented in Myanmar.75 Mamdani famously traces ethnic conflict
to indirect colonial rule in Africa. He describes the bifurcated colonial state, in which society
was fragmented and reorganized hierarchically along ethnic lines. Just as in Africa, Burmese
society was ordered through institutions that divided the population along rural, urban, and
ethnic lines. In an effort to standardize and regulate administration, the British largely
overhauled the system of local government. In Myanmar, roughly two-thirds of the state and the
vast majority of the population lived under the rule of British administrators, while the rest were
governed by native rulers.76 This division of rule separated the population along ethnic lines.
Out of all indigenous groups, the Karen enjoyed the most political privilege. In hill areas,
which were primarily occupied by the Karen and Kachin peoples, traditional rulers and chiefs
exercised significant authority.77 The Karenni states, occupied by a subgroup of the Karen
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people, were particularly autonomous, even retaining nominal sovereignty.78 It is likely that this
autonomy stemmed both from practical concerns, since it was more difficult to control the
remote and mountainous areas where the Karen resided. One British commander said, in
reference to the Karens, that he knew “too little about the people in the hills to reduce them to
any system’ of rule.”79 Ethnic favoritism also bolstered their political position, since the Karen
were well-regarded and trusted by the British. Colonial and military patronage forged
particularly strong associations between Christianized Karen elites and the state.80 In addition to
granting the Karens a high degree of autonomy, the British also gave the Karens reserved seats in
the legislature to protect their interests and the Karens were heavily recruited into the colonial
military. Traditional rulers and chiefs of the Kachin peoples enjoyed significant autonomy,
similarly, stemming from practical concerns and ethnic favoritism, as the Kachins were wellregarded and trusted by the British. Due to the Kachin’s geographic stronghold in the mountains,
the colonial state was much less developed in their area.81
In contrast, while the Mons had assisted the British, they did not receive such favorable
political incorporation or separate representation. Though the British thought highly of the
Mon—they were respected, for example, for being highly literate—and allowed the rurally
settled Kachin political autonomy, they were much more favorable to the Karen, who they
considered to be most amenable to the colonial civilizing mission.82 Compared to the Karens,
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Mon identity was not as strongly politicized or militarized during the colonial period.
Intermarriage and assimilation over time meant that many Burmans viewed the Mons as being
part of their majority group, particularly since the Mons were geographically interspersed
throughout the Burman population in the central state.83
The British were somewhat inconsistent in their treatment of the Mons, sometimes
grouping them with the ethnic majority, but at other times as a distinct group. The British
encouraged attention to distinct Mon literature and culture, and also employed the Mon Paradigm
to rhetorically distinguish the Mons from the Burmans. “By contrasting the Mons’ past greatness
with their current subjugation, the Mon Paradigm called attention to the oppressive nature of
Burmese rule towards the Mons.”84 Such rhetoric was not entirely supported by colonial
institutions, as the British institutions did not target the Mons, either positively or negatively, as
they did other ethnic groups. Contradictory to the British attempt to distinguish between the
Mons and Burmans, the colonial census seemed to increasingly group the two together. In one
district, an 1856 census calculated that nearly half of the population was Mon. In a 1911 census,
only 1,224 people described themselves as Mons out of 532,357 inhabitants.85 Ultimately, Mon
identity was not made as political as Karen identity, but this British did make a convoluted
attempt to separate the Mons from the ethnic Burmans.
Colonial institutions of governance directly elevated the political status of the Karen, and,
to a slightly lesser degree, the Kachin. The Mon might be considered to receive somewhat
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neutral treatment under the British; they were not highly sought after or politically favored, but
they were not directly discriminated on the grounds of ethnic identity. Conversely, the Burmans,
who lived in British controlled areas were largely excluded from governance and unrepresented.
By organizing the colonial apparatus along ethnic lines, the British politicized ethnicity. The
British separated the Karens and Kachins from the Burmans by recruiting them into the colonial
army and elevating their political status, solidifying the precolonial ethnic divisions that had been
imperfect and mostly unpolitical. In the Karens, the British continued to explicitly encourage an
ethnic identity that was formed in opposition to the Burman majority.86 The colonial state made
ethnicity a prominent form of control, and a preeminent concern within the Burmese
population.87
Outside of the ethnically controlled territories that were allowed to maintain traditional
authority, the British largely destroyed indigenous institutions of control. The widespread
destruction of precolonial institutions resulted in a second unintended consequence: an
uncontrolled and increasingly violent society. Callahan contends that the intrusion of a modern
capitalist economy in a precapitalist, agrarian society, was simply incompatible with many local
systems of authority.88 The destruction of the Sangha, the Buddhist monastic order, demonstrates
how the colonial state undermined precolonial social order. Before colonization, the Sangha
served as a culturally unifying force and often collaborated with the state to order society
through religion and schooling.89 Colonial policies de-emphasized religion, in the hopes of
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creating a secular state, and eroded the power of the Sangha, wreaking havoc on Burmese
society.
The loss of precolonial authority, along with unemployment and impoverishment, were
all features that led to widespread social disintegration. This disorder, along with an expansive
colonial definition of crime that treated murderers, thieves, and scavenging peasants as
comparable threats to the state, led to wildly escalating crime rates. “From 1911 to 1921, the
population increased by about 9 percent, but the increase of major crimes ranged from 31 percent
in the case of murder to 109 percent in the case of robbery and dacoity.”90 Dacoity—a catch-all
term for banditry that extended broadly to any form of resistance—was particularly widespread.
The criminalization of opium consumption also led to the increased “discovery” of crime in the
colony.91 Myanmar came to be regarded as the most criminal province in the British empire.92

British Coercion: Military and Policing
The British attempt to organize society for production compelled the pacification of the
Burmese population. As crime and violence escalated, the colonial state found a need for internal
security and responded by expanding the colonial military apparatus and police force. Notably,
the British did not build a new military in Myanmar. A cursory glance at Burmese history might
suggest that Myanmar’s military state is not rooted in the colonial period, since a national
military was not institutionalized until the Japanese occupation. However, the colonial period
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elevated the role of coercive institutions in Burmese governance and primed the state for future
militarism.
In the pursuit of unfettered commerce, the British established, in the words of Callahan, a
“coercion-intensive political relationship between state and society that hardened into durable
institutions and practice.”93 Most colonial military units were focused on maintaining internal
security and suppressing threats to commerce. In fact, there were no real threats to Myanmar’s
borders until the Japanese invasion—the military functioned to order the Burmese population
and played a major role in governing colonial Burma.94 Through the frequent deployment of
armed forces, Burmese society gained extensive experience with the military arm of the colonial
state. Having eliminated the Sangha—an important intermediary institution that brought order to
society—the colonial state was forced to use the military. This necessitated rule by force,
perhaps more so than in other British colonies, where intermediary institutions were not
destroyed.
Colonial policing further amplified the use of coercive force in regulating individual and
social behavior. However, local police forces, underdeveloped and poorly trained, often failed to
successfully bring order to society. The failures of local police units ultimately reinforced the
colonial reliance on the military, setting a pattern of law enforcement that, Callahan argues, still
exists today. The slightest challenge to colonial order provoked military deployment. Within the
colonial apparatus, the role of the military was elevated above all else. This was a weak, shallow
state, barely capable of collecting enough revenue. The colonial state barely existed. Where it
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took form—in military and police units—the state overcompensated with extravagant force.95 In
Myanmar, the British institutionalized an unequal relationship between military and civil
authorities, a relationship that persists today.
Colonial rulers established the military as the most prominent institution of social control
in Myanmar. Furthermore, because of the selective incorporation of certain ethnic groups, the
colonial military institutionalized ethnic divisions. British colonialism established an ethnically
exclusive military institution in Myanmar, a legacy that persists today. The British heavily
recruited their favored ethnic minority groups, the Karen and the Kachin, under the pretext that
they made better soldiers.96 The Karen, Kachin and Chins, were the only indigenous groups
recruited to serve in the British army in Myanmar. While the Mons were not directly recruited
throughout the colonial period, they were not explicitly excluded, as the ethnic Burmans were.97
Burmans were effectively banned from joining the military until 1929. This exclusion was partly
rooted in racist anti-Burman stereotyping, and, particularly in later years of British colonialism,
stemmed from fears of arming and training Burmans who might get swept up in the growing
anticolonial nationalist movement. The colonial military in Myanmar is a classic illustration of
divide and rule, which further institutionalized and militarized ethnic divisions. Below, Figure 2
illustrates the incorporation of ethnic groups into the British Army in Myanmar. Importantly, this
shows that while the British had conceded to the limited incorporation of Burmans a decade
earlier, Burmans were still vastly underrepresented in 1939.98
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Figure 2. The Ethnic Composition of the British Army in Myanmar, in 1939. 99
Ethnic Group

Percent of the Population

Number in Army

Burman

75.11

472

Karen

9.34

1,448

Chin

2.38

868

Kachin

1.05

881

Others (Native and Foreign)

12.12
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The Burmans composed the vast majority of the population (75 percent), yet there were
only 472 Burman soldiers in the British Army. Though the Kachin made up just 1 percent of the
population, they supplied 881 soldiers—nearly twice as many soldiers as the Burmans. The
Karens were also drastically overrepresented: they constituted 9.34 percent of the population, but
1,448 Karens served in the colonial army.100 Based off of the numbers reported above, the
Kachins made up an enormous 37% of the colonial army in 1939. While the Mons are not
represented in this chart, we can assume they contributed a very limited number of soldiers to the
“other” category. It is also likely that some Mons were classified as ethnic Burmans, since the
British were inconsistent in their categorization of the Mons.101
The notion that the Karens and Kachins gained valuable military experience, from which
they could reproduce armed organizations, has been frequently repeated. The extent to which the
colonial military truly served as a “training ground” for minority groups, birthing skilled ethnic
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armies, is unclear, because this notion ultimately became so intertwined with nationalist beliefs
and anti-minority propaganda.102 Whether or not experience in the colonial military directly
equipped minority groups to form ethnic armed organizations in the postcolonial period, their
selective incorporation into the military deeply undermined political cohesion in the Burmese
state. The exclusion of the ethnic Burmans from the military is at least as important as the
inclusion of the Karens and Kachins, as Burman nationalists came to view membership in the
government’s armed forces as collaboration with the enemy.103
Kachin and Karen colonial recruits in particular came to represent not the socially
complex demographic categories that they were, but rather the politically and
ideologically immature embodiments of their respective ‘ethnic groups’ … loyal to
colonialism and having a primitive tendency towards violence combined with a large
dose of political naivety, the colonial military experience provided them with the
knowledge base from which they could endlessly reproduce militarized organizations to
oppose the Burmese state in the longer term.104
Ethnic based recruitment amplified the fears of Burman nationalists and encouraged their
imagining of ethnic soldiers that were deeply loyal to colonialism and subsequently disloyal to
Burman nationalists.105 Along with other policies that elevated the political status of the Karens
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and Kachins (their relative political autonomy and government representation), the colonial
military apparatus institutionalized their ethnic favoritism and solidified ethnic divisions.

Burgeoning Nationalism
Under colonial rule, ethnic Burmans lacked power in their own country, and they became
increasingly frustrated with their disempowered status.106 After nearly five decades of British
rule, nationalism began to develop aggressively in the 1930s. The earliest and most significant
nationalist movements was the Dobama Asiayone or “We Burman Society,” which was
organized chiefly by university students. The members called themselves Thakins, or Masters,
and the party came to be known as the Thakin Party.107 The ultimate goal of the group was
Myanmar’s independence, but their initial objectives included the revival of indigenous language
and culture. In the 1930s, their stated slogan read:
Burma is our country; Burmese literature is our literature; Burmese language is our
language. Love our country, raise the standards of our literature, respect our language.108
While this slogan clearly captures nationalist aspirations of independence, it also reflects the
ethnocratic ideals held by the emerging nationalist groups. The phrase “Burma is our country,”
does not simply reject British governance, it also situates the ethnic Burman nationalists as the
rightful rulers of the country. Along with the Thakin Party, other groups with similar nationalist
aspirations, also emerged during the 1930s, including the the Myochit (Love of Country) Party
and the Sinyetha (Poor Man’s) Party. For all of these emerging nationalists, self-rule meant
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Burman rule. “Minorities were expected to either assimilate or to accept a reduced social and
political status.”109 The emerging nationalist movement was framed as the empowerment of the
Burman majority, who had been excluded and humiliated by the British. Burman nationalists
were staunchly opposed to British policies of minority representation in government, and the
colonial protection of the Kachin and Karen.110 Thus, an ethnically exclusive nationalist
movement began to emerge, fusing its political ideology with a focus on Burmese language and
Buddhist religion. The development of the Burmese nationalist movement also coincided with—
and fueled—the proliferation of local non-state armies.

Political Pocket Armies: The Colonial Volunteer Corps
Ethnically exclusive military policies resulted in another major consequence, which
would further institutionalize ethnic divisions: the emergence of local, non-state military
organizations, which Callahan calls “political pocket armies.”111 Unable to obtain military
training in the colonial armed forces, the Burman-majority nationalist political organizations
established political pocket armies. This militarization spread rapidly—by the mid-1930s every
major nationalist or religious organization had established its own tat.112 Local tats, also referred
to as the volunteer corps, or, in grander terms, “private armies,” were the most politically
organized groups in pre-war Myanmar.113 The volunteer corps were regularly used to terrorize
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political opponents and extort money from wealthy individuals through the threat of beating or
the destruction of property. While there were occasional clashes between different “armies,” they
never posed a serious threat to domestic peace.114
Callahan accurately observes that the most bizarre feature of tats was that the British
tolerated their existence at all. While British law did not permit tats to carry firearms, these were
overtly military organizations, wearing uniforms and carrying out drills and war exercises with
bamboo staffs.115 It is not entirely clear why the British allowed tats to exist; Callahan suggests
that, perhaps the British underestimated anti colonial sentiment, or thought that they could later
integrate tats into the colonial army. Robert Taylor similarly reasons that the British perceived
the tats as ultimately useful. Since the British believed the Burmans to be unfit for military
service, tats were seen as a means of developing Myanmar’s capacity for self-defense, and
instilling discipline in the young men.116 This logic was not entirely wrong: on occasion, some
tats were contracted by the British. Other tats, however, made appearances in anti-government
protests.117
Whatever the rationale, the British tolerance of this widespread militarization further
“institutionalized the ethnically demarcated boundaries between ‘collaborators’ and
‘nationalists.’”118 The existence of tats resulted directly from ethnic exclusion in the colonial
state, and tats were fundamentally ethnically based, local militia. In the colonial military
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apparatus, British colonizers institutionalized ethnic boundaries and militarized the Burmese
population along ethnic lines.

The Colonial Legacy
The colonial state hardened ethnic divisions, keeping communities apart and building a
history of animosity.119 Before colonization, ethnic identity and culture was highly textured and
elastic. As the state enforced ethnic divisions, two related changes occurred, both of which are
described by Mamdani. First, ethnic identity was homogenized and flattened, in favor of an
official version. Second, the imposition of law along ethnic boundaries turned the simple fact of
ethnic diversity into a source of tension.120 Through indirect rule, the military apparatus, and the
tolerance of ethnic nationalist tats, the colonial state established ethnic identity as the foundation
of political and military mobilization. Colonial policies of ethnic stratification created fault lines
of ethnic conflict, along which conflict would be reproduced. As the British subverted the
precolonial power balance, elevating the Karen and Kachin, and subjugating the Burmans, it
made these three ethnic identities highly politically salient. While the British made ethnicity a
prominent form of control in Myanmar, Mon identity was not as strongly politicized or
militarized during the colonial period. Caught between the British, their favored ethnic minority
groups, and the Burmese majority, the Mons emerged from the colonial period in a slightly
uncertain position. As a whole, the British created a society in which ethnicity was a yardstick
for political power.
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The colonial military apparatus and nationalist tats further divided Burmese society,
militarizing the population along ethnic lines. Throughout the colonial period, an undercurrent of
nationalism was rising, with a clear focus on overcoming colonial humiliation and restoring the
power of the Burman majority.121 Colonial interference shaped a nationalist movement that came
to be defined in ethnic terms, as a line was drawn between “colonial collaborators” and Burman
nationalists. Today, these groups are still deeply divided—the Karens, Kachins and Mons have
birthed violent insurgent groups that target the Burman controlled state, making violent,
separatist claims. The ethnic divisions politicized by the British remain highly salient, decades
later.
The political and ethnic divisions institutionalized during the colonial period can be
easily mapped onto contemporary civil conflict. Myanmar’s ethnically exclusive military
controls the state, overshadowing its weak civil institutions. The central government is gripped
by an ethno-nationalist ideology that refuses to accommodate minority groups. Small, ethnically
defined insurgent armies, easily likened to colonial tats, fight back against the state. Thus far, my
findings support my first hypothesis: British colonialism established fault lines of conflict in
Myanmar, determining the course of ethnic conflict. Verghese similarly concludes that in
Myanmar, the colonial period created “patterns of violence [that] became self-reinforcing; every
riot hardened ethnic divisions.”122 However, this finding leads to the seemingly counterintuitive
claim that the Japanese occupation did not significantly disrupt colonial legacies or cast new
patterns of violence. Institutional continuity requires active attempts to maintain existing
institutions. If the British colonial institutions continue to define ethnic conflict in Myanmar,
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how did this colonial legacy survive the Japanese period? In the following chapter, I will address
this question.

50
Chapter Three: The Japanese Occupation and Wartime Institutions
Introduction
As the colonial state dissolved, Myanmar began a new, complex chapter of statehood,
amidst the theater of World War II. The Burmese state was launched from colonial rule into
wartime politics, as Japanese invaders rapidly stripped the Burmese state of colonial
administrators and began to construct a new, wartime state. Classical bellicist theory and Tilly’s
famous logic suggest that Japan’s wartime occupation of Myanmar would be institutionally
transformative. Theories of wartime institution building demand the scrutiny of my first finding,
that colonial legacies determine Myanmar’s violent pattern of ethnic conflict. If the institutional
legacies of colonialism define modern ethnic conflict, how did these institutions survive the
massive disruption that occurred during the Japanese invasion? Thus, I return to my second
hypothesis and consider the possibility that the Japanese occupation disrupted British
institutional legacies, redefining patterns of conflict.
The Japanese invasion brought about the swift and irreversible collapse of the British
colonial state.123 However, the Japanese never undertook an extensive statebuilding project to
build a new administrative machinery. Tilly’s causal logic anticipates the concentration of
coercive power, and the development of state institutions to extract resources and protect the
state accumulation of capital. The Japanese did concentrate coercive power, building the first
national military in Myanmar. There was no direct antecedent to the national military constructed
by the Japanese, since the British had merely integrated indigenous forces into the colonial
military. The Japanese built a Burmese military from scratch, and in doing so, established what
has been, ever since, Myanmar’s preeminent political institution. However, this national military
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was almost the extent of Japanese wartime institution building. There was no concerted effort to
build institutions that would extract resources or protect capital.
Centeno’s analysis of wartime states in Latin America frames one explanation for the
Japanese failure to build meaningful institutions in Myanmar. Latin American states entered into
war too soon after independence, and thus they lacked the basic organizational capacity that was
needed to respond in the pattern described by Tilly. While the exact circumstances in Myanmar
were different—notably, the state was not yet independent, only occupied by a different imperial
power—the Burmese state certainly lacked any organizational capacity that the Japanese might
have harnessed to build institutions. The Japanese, like the British, built a skinny,
underdeveloped state that privileged the military. Wartime developments under the Japanese did
alter Burmese state institutions and ethnic politics, but ultimately, did not overwrite the British
legacy. In fact, the opposite occurred. Institutional path dependence is the notion that an
institution, once established, is difficult to change, and furthermore, that existing institutions
constrain and shape the development of future institutions.124 From the beginning, the impacts of
Japanese imperialism mirrored those of British colonialism, because it was constrained by a state
and society shaped by the colonial period. There was no clear institutional break between the two
periods. In this chapter, I argue that the Japanese occupation reinforced the British legacy of
ethnic divisions and militarization by building an ethnically exclusive nationalist military that
came to define the state.
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Japanese Invasion and Occupation
Japanese policy towards Myanmar—invasion, occupation, and ultimately,
independence—was dictated by military expedience.125 The Japanese invasion of Myanmar was
seen as necessary for two reasons, as reported in a 1941 War Ministry policy review. First,
occupying Myanmar would establish a key position for the Japanese defense line and second, it
would cut off supplies to China by disrupting the Burma Road to Yunnan.126 Another imperative
was later added as the Japanese strategized their invasion: the occupation of Myanmar would
accelerate its alienation from Great Britain.127
From the beginning, the Japanese sought to collaborate with the Burmese nationalist
movement, in order to achieve their military goals. In 1940, the Imperial General Headquarters
in Tokyo dispatched Colonel Suzuki to Myanmar, where he made contacts with nationalist
leaders and identified the Thakin Party as the most important arm of the independence
movement.128 Suzuki pledged that Japan would help Myanmar achieve independence, which was
well received by Burman nationalists—after failing to make headway with the British, nationalist
leaders were desperately seeking foreign military aid.129 Appealing to nationalist organizations
with imagery of “sweeping away British power,” the Japanese began to source recruits for their
military effort in Myanmar.130 The Japanese tapped into groups of young, anticolonial
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nationalists who hoped to oust the British and gain independence, and smuggled many of them
out of the country for military training.131 Famously, in 1941, thirty young nationalists, known as
the “Thirty Comrades,” were secretly taken to Hainan Island, to prepare them to fight in an
uprising against the British. One of the men recruited was Thakin Aung San, one of the most
influential nationalist leaders in Myanmar.132 Japanese-style military discipline was new to these
Burmans recruits, who had been excluded from the colonial army. At first, the Burmans were
exhausted and demoralized by their rigorous training, but their political ambitions propelled
them, as they were eager to prepare for themselves for the liberation of Myanmar. In addition to
learning military skills and tactics, the recruits carried out war games and were encouraged to
strengthen their spirit of self-sacrifice. 133 These soldiers would make up the nucleus of the
Burmese Independence Army. Even before Japanese invasion, Myanmar’s national military had
begun to take form.

Building a Military
The Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was the first iteration of Myanmar’s national
military. While the obvious function of the BIA was to provide military support to Japan’s
invading troops, the creation of this “independence army” was also a necessary evil. The
Japanese provided invaluable military training and aid to anticolonial Burman nationalists, in
exchange for their collaboration. Incorporating the Thirty Comrades and other Japanese trained
nationalists, the BIA came into being formally in December 1941. The BIA expanded rapidly,
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with overwhelmingly successful recruitment—within a few weeks of the BIA’s arrival in
Myanmar, it was estimated to be as large as 200,000 men.134 Nearly all BIA members were
ethnically Burman, though the Burmans constituted roughly 65-70 percent of the population.
Expanding and strengthening the BIA was never a Japanese priority, and “in the chaotic early
months of the Japanese conquest and occupation, the BIA emerged as an entity that far outpaced
Japanese plans.”135 This early and unanticipated growth foreshadows Japan’s ultimate loss of
control over the Burmese military.
Colonial society was primed for Japanese militarization—along with the widespread
banditry and anti-British sentiment in Burmese society, the British had established the military as
the preeminent political institution and militarized its population along ethnic lines. The rapid
growth of the BIA can be attributed to two factors that emerged out of the colonial period: local
traditions of dacoity and rampant anti-British sentiment.136 While the establishment of a national
military is a distinct product of the Japanese, the institution emerged within a state and society
that had just abruptly emerged from British rule. The establishment of a national military
institution is the defining legacy of the Japanese occupation, but this legacy was distinctly
supported by the colonial experience.

The Japanese Military Administration
As the war expanded further into Myanmar in early 1942, the Japanese were faced with a
critical issue—the question of independence. When exactly should the Japanese grant the
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independence that they continued to promise? The Japanese lacked an entirely coherent policy in
Myanmar, which led to widespread confusion and contradiction regarding the promotion of
Burmese independence. This confusion is reflected in two nearly simultaneous pronouncements
made in Tokyo.137 On the 15th of November 1941, it was announced that the independence of
Burma would be promoted and used to stimulate the independence of India. Only five days later,
the exact same policymaking body announced that it had decided to “encourage the native
peoples to have a deep appreciation and trust for the Imperial Army” and “to avoid any action
that may stimulate unduly or induce an early independence movement.”138 Ultimately, the
Japanese decided to delay Burmese independence, reasoning that friction between the Burmese
and Japanese governments might impede Japanese military operations.139
A military administration was established in March 1942—a turning point in Burman
Japanese relations.140 The Japanese established the Military Administrative Department (M.A.D)
with the goal of procuring resources essential to their operations in Myanmar and elsewhere.
M.A.D (later, Military Administration Headquarters) was staffed by army officers and Japanese
civilians who were sent to Myanmar. All iterations of the Japanese administration in Myanmar
were headed by a military commander.141 In the “General Plan for Enforcing Military
Administration in Burma,” Colonel Ishii outlined the guiding principles for the Japanese
administration.
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“The major objective of enforcing the military administration in Burma is the rapid
procurement of the resources essential for national defense and self-support of the
Japanese forces in Burma. To achieve this objective, the military administration will
retain complete control over Burmese affairs—political, economic, diplomatic, and
military. The military administration will be responsible to the Commander of the
Fifteenth Army.”142
While some Japanese civilians and pro-Japanese Burmans were employed in the Japanese
administration, it was a fundamentally military enterprise—political, economic, and diplomatic
issues were all under the oversight of the Fifteenth Army. This military supremacy is definitive
of the Japanese occupation in Myanmar.
The Japanese also established the Burma Baho Government, or Burma Central
Government, in Rangoon, which was essentially a figurehead government. The Baho
Government was placed under the oversight of Thakins, with Burman nationalist Tun Oke as the
nominal head. The purpose of the Baho government was to “create some semblance of order in
the administrative units of the BIA,” which were scattered through Lower Myanmar.143 In
actuality, the administrative authority of the government did not extend much beyond the capital
of Rangoon. The BIA was placed under the command of Japan’s Fifteenth Army, and while it
was a “Burman” army, it was Japanese led. The Japanese used the Governor-General’s residence
(the seat of the colonial government) as the headquarters of the Military Administration, which
further symbolized the preeminence of the Japanese Military Administration over the BIA and
the Baho Government. The BIA had anticipated use of the Governor-General’s residence as its
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own headquarters in Rangoon, and its seizure by the Japanese Army caused bitterness among the
BIA officer corps. The use of the Governor-General’s residence was taken as symbolic of the
real relationship between the Japanese Army and Myanmar.144
Anticipating an independent government, Burmese nationalists felt deeply betrayed by
the establishment of military administration in Myanmar: it became evident that Japan was now
intending to rule Myanmar. Nationalist leaders began to regard the Japanese as conquerors,
rather than liberators. While the Baho Government was essentially a figurehead government,
tasked with restoring law and order in occupied villages and districts, BIA leaders still expected
that it would become the legitimate government of Myanmar.145 Thus, anti-Japanese sentiment
further escalated when, after just two months of its existence, the Baho Government was abruptly
dissolved. As demands for independence escalated, the Japanese had found it too difficult to
work with the Baho Government and replaced it with a “pro-Japanese government” that could be
more easily handled. Similarly, the Japanese Army assumed tighter control over the Burman
army.146 The Japanese disbanded the BIA and attempted to reorganize the army as the BDA (the
Burma Defense Army), and again, later, as the BNA (the Burma National Army).147 Ultimately,
it was too late—the Japanese were unable to control and pacify the Burmans. The relationship
between the Burmans and the Japanese had been irreparably damaged, and anti-Japanese
sentiment burgeoned.
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The Japanese administration brought no stability to Myanmar’s volatile political
landscape. In fact, it did the opposite. The mere existence of the administration provoked outrage
among Burman nationalists, and the state itself was barely capable of carrying out the minimal
functions of maintaining order and regulating institutions.148 The Japanese certainly made no
concerted effort to prepare the Burmese state and people for independence and self-governance.
In a time of immense uncertainty and instability, the Japanese built only one powerful institution:
the military. When the Burmese later gained independence, the military was the only institution
with a strong foundation. Japan’s administration in Myanmar amplified the British legacy and
established the military as the preeminent institution of governance.

Militarized Ethnicity
Under colonial rule, Burmese nationalism had been sharply defined along ethnic lines. By
framing their military project in nationalist terms, the Japanese built a national institution that
transmitted the colonial legacy of militarization into post-independence politics and reinforced
the ethnic divisions created by the British. By recruiting ethnic Burman nationalists, the Japanese
military institutionalized the same ethnic divisions as the British but subverted the balance of
power. While the British had selectively recruited Karens and Kachins and excluded Burmans,
the Japanese recruited mostly Burmans and shunned the ethnic groups who had served in the
colonial forces.149 The Japanese were untrusting of the ethnic groups that they viewed as being
allied with the British. In Myanmar, as they did elsewhere, they adhered to a policy of avoiding
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the segments of the population which served in the colonial regime.150 The Japanese selected for
special education and training the very segments of the population that had been excluded by the
colonial regime, and built an ethnically exclusive military that elevated the political and military
status of the previously disenfranchised Burmans.151 Verghese finds patterns of violence that
were established during the colonial period persisted into postcolonial India because they were
embedded in institutions. When the Japanese built a Burmese national military, they crystallized
ethnic divisions in a military institution that was far more durable and permanent than the
colonial armed forces.
During World War II, the ethnic tensions underlying Burmese politics became
increasingly volatile. While Burmese nationalists were gaining power, influence, and
opportunity, other individuals and interests that had had been protected in the colonial system
were suddenly left vulnerable.152 Calls for independence found few sympathizers among the
minority groups, who stood to be overpowered by the Burman majority.153 By promoting a
narrative in which the Burmans were the rightful leaders of their country, the Japanese
exacerbated the fears of minority groups.154 During the invasion of Myanmar, Japanese
propaganda broadcasts repeated the slogans “Asia for the Asians” and “Burma for the Burmans”
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and stressed the ‘glorious past’ of the Burmese people.155 This propaganda emphasized that the
Japanese saw the Buddhist Burmans as allies and the rightful ruling class.156 Japanese strategy
reinforced the ethnically demarcated boundaries of the nationalist movement and elevated the
political status of ethnic Burman majority. As Myanmar’s political future loomed uncertain,
ethnic tensions escalated.

Karens
The Japanese subverted the power balance in a manner that most directly benefited the
Burmans and harmed the Karens: it was along this ethnic divide that violent conflict escalated
most severely. The Karens lost the protected position they had enjoyed under the colonial
administration and were fearful of their minority political status in an independent state
controlled by Burman nationalists. For these reasons, Karen leaders sought to bring about the
return of the British.157 Karen leaders also began to articulate their goal of an autonomous ethnic
state post World War II. The British took advantage of the Karens’ insecure position and rallied
them to fight alongside the Allied powers. Decolonization is a long and complicated process—
while the colonial power had been removed from Myanmar, the British still exerted wartime
influence over segments of the Burmese population—particularly the Karens and Kachins.
British officers encouraged the Karens that “their dream of a Karen state might be realized after
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the war.”158 Many Karens believed that the British would reward them for their loyalty by
helping them construct an autonomous ethnic state. British and American operatives
also distributed extensive anti-Burman propaganda, which identified Burman nationalists as a
key enemy, along with the Japanese. Such propaganda emphasized historical grievances between
the Burmans and Karens and reinforced the idea that the Allied forces would support the Karens
in pursuing an independent state and resisting the Burman nationalists.159 In pursuit of two
different futures for their country, the Karen fought alongside the Japanese, and the Burman BIA
fought alongside the British. Many Karens (and Kachins) were recruited by the British and
provided with military training, often in India. After receiving intensive training in conventional
and guerilla warfare, they returned to Myanmar in regular Allied divisions, or even in undercover
units behind Japanese lines.160 As the divide deepened between the BIA and the Karens,
ethnically motivated violence grew more extreme.
The Karens’ loyalty to the British led to their oppression by the Japanese through the
BIA. When Karens in Lower Burma refused to accept the authority of the BIA and relinquish
their guns, hostilities quickly escalated between them. In 1942, entire Karen communities were
put under arrest and public executions were held, either “for disloyalty to the new Burmese
regime or to make an example of those unwilling to cooperate with the BIA.”161 In one
Myaungmya district, over 1,800 Karens were killed, and 400 villages were destroyed. Communal
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violence between the Burman BIA soldiers and Karens ended only due to Japanese
intervention.162 In 1946, Saw Tha Din, a future leader of Karen insurrection remarked:
How could anyone expect the Karen people to trust the Burmans after what happened …
the murder and slaughter of so many Karen people and the robbing of so many Karen
villages? After all this, how could anyone seriously expect us to trust any Burman
government in Rangoon? 163
While the Japanese later attempted to mitigate the conflict between Burmans and Karens by
forming a Karen battalion in the military, it was too little too late. The events of 1942 were never
forgotten.164 Not only did the BIA commit atrocities against the Karen, but the puppet Burmese
government came to be identified with the brutalities endured under the Japanese, fueling the
ethnic and antagonism and conflict that continues today.165 While the Karens and Burmans were
divided under the British, they were not directly engaged in violent conflict. The Japanese stoked
these divisions, and ethnic violence between the Karens and Burmans began to ensue in full.
Together, the British and Japanese established corrosive institutions that divided the population
and politicized and militarized ethnic identity, creating a deep divide between the Burmans and
the Karens.
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Kachins
The Kachins, like the Karens, were pro-British and engaged in Japanese resistance. US
and British operatives targeted the Kachins with the same propaganda that was distributed
amongst the Karens—emphasizing grievances with the Burman population and depicting them
as the ultimate enemy. Again, as with the Karens, the British made promises of independence
and autonomy following the war and encouraged Kachin aspirations of statehood. Throughout
World War II, the Karens and Kachins fought alongside the British, but they were fighting for
their own distinct visions of political independence as separate ethnic states.
The Japanese never established complete control of the Kachin and Chin territories (this
would be the first area recaptured by the Allies in 1944-1945). The British reported that “[the
Kachins] refusal to cooperate with the Japanese … finally forced the Japanese to abandon their
position in the hills.166 Thus, while the Kachins mobilized to fight against the Japanese, the
Japanese occupation and the collapse of the colonial state did not appear to impact them as
drastically as it impacted the Karens. The Kachins’ geographic stronghold near the Chinese and
Indian borders provided them with a degree of separation from the politics and conflict in central
Myanmar.167 The BIA/BNA did not ever operate in the Kachin held areas.168 While the Kachins
were involved in violent conflict, they fought directly against Japanese troops, rather than against
pro-Japanese Burman nationalists. Unlike the Karens and Burmans, the Kachins and Burmans
had no meaningful history of ethnic conflict, until they fought on opposite sides during World
War II.
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Both under the British and the Japanese, we see that the Kachins’ geographic stronghold
is definitive of their ethnic experience. Compared to the other ethnic groups studied in this paper,
the Kachins were uniquely autonomous during the Japanese occupation. Silverstein even
contends that “Japan’s authority had little or no effect on the people living in the area of the
present Kachin and Chin states.”169 While the Kachin people were not subjugated under the
Japanese, the Japanese occupation and WWII had lasting impacts on Kachin identity and
politics. In the Kachin region, the greatest impact was not made by the Japanese Military
Administration or BIA, but rather by the international conflict dynamics that solidified the ethnic
divisions between the Kachin and the Burmans. In fact, during World War II it seems that the
British were more influential in shaping the conflict between the Kachins and Burmans than the
Japanese were. While the Japanese were distrusting of the Kachins and Karens, they had no
reason to intentionally create ethnic conflict between the Burman nationalists and ethnic
minorities. However, the British strategically stoked this conflict, in order to rouse anti-Burman
and anti-Japanese sentiment, and to increase support for the Allied forces.

Mons
Like the Kachins, the Mons were less drastically impacted by the Japanese occupation.
This is in part due to their relative position under the colonial administration—Karens were at
the top of the colonial food chain, and thus had the most to lose. In the case of the Mons, their
identity was less politicized than Karen and Kachin identities, both during the colonial period
and the Japanese occupation. Intermarriage and assimilation over time meant that many Burmans
viewed the Mons as being part of their majority group, and therefore, the elevation of Burman
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status was not inherently harmful to the Mon people. Additionally, as a group that was
geographically dispersed throughout the Burmans, Mons faced difficulties organizing and
forming a collective identity. During the Japanese occupation, the Mons were generally
accepting of Burman leadership and nationalism. In fact, there were even influential Mon
nationalists. 170 Throughout the Japanese occupation and early independence, the Mon were
faced with a fundamental question, the answer to which determined their political behavior.
Would they do better to stand independently or work with the Burman majority? The Mons
appear to have favored the latter option for decades. The Japanese loosely grouped the Mon with
the ethnic Burmans, and thus the Japanese occupation did not appear to have an immediate
impact on Mon identity and ethnic politics. However, in the chaos left behind by the Japanese in
the post-independence period, the Mons joined the Karens and Kachins in their efforts to assert
separatist claims. This, perhaps unanticipated, organizing of Mon political groups will be further
investigated in the following chapter.171

Nationalist Revolt
Desperately seeking to pacify the Burmese people and gain support, the Japanese granted
nominal independence to Myanmar in 1943. As the British counter-offensive in Myanmar grew
stronger, Japanese policymakers concluded that the current policy of delayed independence must
be immediately abandoned. Still, many Japanese leaders had serious reservations, and
consequently, the “independent” Burmese government was controlled by the Japanese.172 In fact,
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the new Burmese government was almost powerless; the Japanese Army Commander made
virtually all political, economic, military, and diplomatic decisions for it. The Burmese had been
granted independence without even sovereignty. The state remained under control of the
Japanese military, and, again, no concerted effort was made to build institutions or establish a
true government.173
Japan’s insincere gesture of nominal independence failed to appease the Burmese and
secure their cooperation. Instead, it provoked greater anti-Japanese sentiment. On the first
anniversary of “independence,” Aung San spoke at the ceremony, saying “our independence
exists only on paper and the peoples have yet to enjoy the benefits. … A long hard road still lies
between us and our goals.”174 The Burmese revolt against the Japanese did not happen all at
once. Dissatisfaction with the Japanese Military Administration had emerged early on. As
discussed earlier, the weakness of the Baho Government and the Japanese occupation of the
Governor-General’s residence frustrated the BIA officer corps and nationalists. The
reorganization of the BIA as the BDA also provoked anti-Japanese sentiment. Many officers
interpreted this reorganization as the Japanese attempt to reassert more direct control over the
BIA—which it was.175 After creating the BIA, the Japanese made no clear plans for its future.
Sitting idle, militarized Burman nationalists turned towards resistance.176
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As early as October 1942, young BIA officers met secretly to distribute anti-Japanese
leaflets and discuss issues of ideology, strategy, and tactics.177 By 1944, nominal independence
had failed to slow the resistance movement, and BDA officers grew increasingly insistent. The
Japanese contemplated expanding the army (which had been reformulated, yet again, as the
Burmese National Army—BNA), in order to offset the dissatisfaction within the ranks.
However, facing a weapons shortage, the expansion of the BNA was an impossible feat, and the
Japanese were unable to alleviate the BNA tensions.178
The earliest outbreak of revolt against the Japanese occurred in March 1945, when Bo Ba
Htut, a BNA commander, declared war against the Japanese. Bo Ba Htut led his battalion to
cross sides and join the invading Allied forces. Japanese advisors considered disarming the
BNA, in order to prevent further rebellion, but ultimately determined that Bo Ba Htut’s
resistance was an isolated incident. This proved to be a fateful miscalculation. All across
Myanmar, violent quarrels began to erupt between the Japanese and the Burmans.179 After the
outbreak of revolt, several Japanese officers were killed by BNA troops. This rising domestic
conflict coincided with British military advances, and the successful recapture of the cities
Meiktila and Mandalay by the Allied forces.
Ultimately, the Japanese trained military revolted against the Japanese and joined forces
with the Allies.180 By rebelling against their Japanese tutors, the BIA demonstrated that they had
become a real independence army. The difficulty of harnessing Burmese nationalism proved
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fatal for the Japanese. After securing control of Myanmar, the Japanese made no clear plans for
the future of the BIA. In fact, they did not intend to use it in combat until 1945. By then, it was
far too late.181 The Japanese created a Burmese military, fed and fattened it on nationalism, and
then kept it idle. The Japanese attempts to reformulate and reincarnate the BIA, as the Burmese
Defense Army (BDA), and then the Burmese National Army (BNA), did little to check its
power. The Burmese military gained a viability of its own, becoming a greater force than the
Japanese could control.
As a whole, the Japanese resistance movement was tenuous and decentralized.
Throughout the Japanese occupation, the British had been lurking in the shadows, arming proBritish minority groups, and attempting to exert influence over the hills that the Japanese were
unable to control. The resistance was necessarily centrifugal—the secret nature of raising
resistance loosely tied together different armed groups and networks to fight against the
Japanese. By the end of the war, the Allied forces, Karens, Kachins, Burmans, and other
minority groups were fighting against the Japanese, joined by other armed guerillas. The
decentralized nature of the resistance plan makes it difficult to understand how exactly these
different forces worked together to reoccupy Myanmar, and there is evidence that the relations
between the different actors were quite contentious from the start. The resistance campaign was
composed of a network of groups that were “fighting against the same enemy but fighting for
very different visions of the future.”182 Ethnic groups which had long been in conflict were
suddenly fighting for the same side—but they were hardly fighting in unison. Karen and Kachin
leaders still believed that the Allied powers would support their postwar autonomy and
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independence, will Burman nationalists expected to take control of an independent and united
Myanmar.
As it became increasingly clear that the campaign against the Japanese would be
relatively brief and successful, the anti-Japanese forces began to turn toward state rebuilding.183
At the end of the war, Myanmar was yet again under the control of the British military, which
had the chief concern of re-establishing law and order and normal living conditions. Under the
British, the Burmese people began to contend with their irreconcilable visions of the postwar
state. Without any clear heir to the Japanese state, a patchwork of competing claims emerged:
allies-turned-enemies were everywhere.184 Burmese nationalists’ desire for independence had
reached a boiling point, and with the British they began to plan for an independent united
Myanmar.185 The Karens quickly began to campaign against this plan, in which they would be
minority partners in national leadership, and proposed the creation of a new state “Karenistan,”
which would be separate from Burmese territory.186 The British demanded that Myanmar’s
ethnic groups reach an agreement before independence was granted.187 This led to the Panglong
Agreement in February 1947, which articulated steps to achieve a political solution to Burma’s
diversity, including political autonomy for minority groups.188 The Panglong agreement granted
ethnic states the right to secede after 10 years and even endorsed a future Kachin State. The
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agreement was signed by Kachin, Chin, and Shan leaders—notably, the dissenting Karens were
excluded from the agreement, reflecting the deep distrust between the Karens and the Burman
government.189 The Mons were also excluded, which is reflective of the Burman insistence that
Mons had no separate identity. While the Panglong agreement was a landmark agreement and a
powerful step forward, the tension between Burman nationalists and ethnic minority groups was
entirely unresolved, especially in the case of the Karen.
Furthermore, the assassination of Aung San in July 1947 deprived the country of a
respected and skillful politician, who was regarded as the postwar architect of national unity and
independence. Without Aung San, the country faced an even greater struggle to bridge the
differences between the Burman majority and ethnic minorities.190 Ultimately, the promises
contained in the Panglong Agreement were never honored. When Myanmar gained political
independence in 1948, a unitary state was forced on ethnic areas under control of the Burmese
government. Thus, Myanmar entered into independence in the midst of a power struggle between
competing ethnic groups.191

The Japanese Legacy
While the Japanese created a military to serve their own political and military goals
during wartime, it ultimately provided a generation of Burman nationalists with rigorous military
training. Louis Allen, who fought in Myanmar during World War II and conducted exhaustive
research on the Japanese, suggested that, while not entirely tangible, the establishment of the
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BIA and Baho Government had “the effect of imparting self-confidence to the Burmese: they
learned what it was like, even on a small scale, to control the means of physical compulsion
through their own forces.”192 The Japanese trained and politicized an ethnically Burman military
cadre, which then fed directly into the post-war political elite.193 Joyce Lebra, writing in 1977,
notes that that nearly all of Burma’s army officers, members of the Revolutionary Council and
diplomatic corps were descended directly from these Japanese-trained units. Since independence,
Japanese trained officers, and their descendants, have controlled the Burmese state. Ultimately,
Japan’s wartime occupation had an effect which cannot be overemphasized: the militarization
and politicization of an ethnically Burman post-war elite.194 The Japanese occupation did not
overwrite the colonial legacy. Instead, colonial fault lines of conflict were preserved and even
intensified.
There was no clear institutional break between the British colonial period and the
Japanese occupation of Myanmar. Constrained by the residual colonial state and focused
singularly on wartime imperatives, the Japanese did not redefine Burmese political institutions,
but rather solidified crucial features of the colonial state. Throughout the colonial period, the
primacy of coercive force, mounting ethnic tensions, and anti-British nationalist sentiment
produced a society that was ripe for Japanese militarism. These forces would later outpace the
national military that was trained and politicized, then left dormant. The Japanese occupation
directly elevated the status of Burmans, and then left them with an ethnically exclusive military
institution—for the Burmans, the ultimate imperial gift. Generations of these military cadres
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have grasped tightly to the state in Myanmar since, and self-serving, conservative elites have
maintained the supremacy of the military.
When studying colonial legacies, a difficulty often arises in definitively tracing these
legacies through their different institutional forms.195 In Myanmar, British and Japanese
institutional legacies map quite clearly onto contemporary conflict. The modern military state is
controlled by the Burmans, and civil conflict continuously erupts along ethnic lines, with the
Karen, Kachin, and Mon insurgencies posing significant threats to the central state. At least
twelve major insurgent groups have been explicitly defined as being Karen or Kachin, and at
least two as Mon.196 The following chapter will examine the emergence and activity of these
groups in the post-independence period. The Japanese wartime campaign ultimately reproduced
colonial era ethnic identities, which still persist today. Further research on this subject might
investigate whether this finding is typical or atypical—when does war scramble ethnic identities,
and when does it reproduce them?
In the case of Myanmar, the Japanese harnessed an ethnically defined nationalist
movement to serve their own wartime imperatives. In doing so, the Japanese further
institutionalized the ethnic demarcation between nationalists and “colonial collaborators,”
fueling ethnic violence and amplifying the mistrust and resentment that has come to define
Myanmar’s divided population. As Andrew Selth writes, “the Japanese sought to use the
nationalist aspirations of one racial group while the British sought to take advantage of the hopes
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and fears of the other. In this struggle both Burmese groups seem to have been betrayed.”197 It is
impossible to entirely disentangle the legacies of the British and the Japanese, which coincided,
almost perfectly, to politicize and militarize ethnic divisions.
The Japanese left behind a militant and divided population, with ethnic groups that were
deeply distrusting of those who had fought on the opposite side of the war. While the Burmans
were left in a position of power, they were ill positioned for governance. The military was the
only residual institution, and thus, the military became the nucleus of the post-independence
government, just as it had been under the British and the Japanese. As uncertainty loomed, the
Burmese population underwent mass mobilization. Within six months of independence, Karens,
Kachins and Mons all attempted to assert separatist claims against the Burman dominated
government in Rangoon, motivated by racial antagonisms. The insurgencies that erupted in the
early post-independence period continue, to different degrees, today.198
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Chapter Four: Independence and Insurgency
Introduction
The institutions built by the British and Japanese politicized and militarized ethnicity in
Myanmar, creating deep fault lines in Burmese society along which conflict has continuously
erupted. However, there is variance in this conflict—the behaviors of Burmese ethnic groups
have changed across space and time. While all of Myanmar’s seven major ethnic minority
groups have been linked to insurgency, these insurgent experiences are distinct, with different
durations, levels of violence, and engagement in ceasefire politics. By selecting the Karens,
Kachins, and Mons for study, I capture some of the variation that can be observed in Myanmar’s
enduring civil conflict and examine the nuances of Burmese ethnic politics.
The violent conflict between the Karens and ethnic Burmans is the longest running and
most consistent conflict in Myanmar, beginning before the colonial period and continuing today,
as the Karen National Union (KNU) still fights against the state. After engaging in ceasefire
negotiations in 2012, the Karen resumed their fight against the central state following the
military coup in 2021. The Mons entered into direct conflict with the ethnic Burmans much later
than the Karens did. After decades of assimilation to the ethnic majority group, the Mons
suddenly rebelled against the state after Myanmar gained political independence. Mon political
behavior underwent another major shift when the New Mon State Party (NMSP) signed a
ceasefire agreement in 1995.199 After decades of insurgency, Mon insurgents are now relatively
inactive compared to their Karen and Kachin counterparts. What can explain the variance in Mon
behavior over time? Lastly, the Kachin insurgency began in the early 1960’s, a decade after the
Karens and Mons rebelled. Why do we observe this delayed engagement in ethnic insurgency?
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Like the Mons, the Kachins suspended insurgency and signed a ceasefire in the 1990s. Then, like
the Karens, they took up arms against the government in 2021.200 The varying behaviors of
Burmese ethnic groups complicates my findings thus far and challenges the notion of path
dependency.
As a whole, this thesis aims to answer the question: how much do institutional legacies
matter when explaining ethnic conflict? Thus far, my findings suggest that institutional legacies
are instrumental in explaining Myanmar’s ethnic conflict. The institutions built by the British
and Japanese politicized and militarized ethnicity in Myanmar, creating deep fault lines in
Burmese society along which conflict has continuously erupted. However, institutional
continuity requires active attempts to maintain those existing institutions. I have traced the origin
of contentious ethnic divisions to British rule, but for these identities to remain politically salient,
they would have to be reinforced in later decades. Conflict actors have not acted uniformly
across time and space, suggesting that other influences—outside of British and Japanese
institutions—have shaped their behaviors.
Karen Leonard cautions against a historical “obsession” with British colonialism, which
“[overlooks] ways of interpreting the past and present that do not make colonial rule responsible
for all that has happened.”201 After focusing closely on the colonial period and the Japanese
occupation, this chapter takes a broader view of post-independence Myanmar and contemporary
history, in order to trace the dynamics of ethnic competition and determine how ethnic identities
might have been shifted or reinforced. I examine the potential for conflict dynamics to evolve
under the postcolonial regime. In doing so, I test my findings thus far and consider my third
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hypothesis: Ethnic conflict in Myanmar has not been determined by institutional legacies;
political and social factors have shaped the behaviors of conflict actors, driving the evolution of
ethnic conflict. I will first describe the period immediately following independence, during which
insurgencies began to take form and the state began to take shape. I will then take a broader
historical view and consider ethnic minorities’ varied responses to a political landscape shifting
towards ceasefire politics. Ultimately, I conclude that ethnic identities have mostly hardened
over time, along the same colonial and imperial divisions I have examined thus far. However, the
British and Japanese institutional legacies cannot entirely explain the variance in ethnic
behaviors over time, and thus it is important to consider other social and political dynamics.

Early Independence
The transfer of power from the British to the Burmese occurred on January 4, 1948. It did
little to slow the turmoil ripping through the already thin fabric of the national state.202
Throughout World War II and the Japanese resistance, the Burmese population underwent
widespread mobilization, taking up arms to fight on both sides of the war. After the war’s end,
the members of this militarized population did not placidly lay down their arms. Armed
personnel directly fed into either the Tatmadaw or private armies and ethnic armed
organizations.203 While the British had encouraged ethnic minority groups to dream of political
independence after the war, these minority groups had suddenly fallen under the rule of the
Burman majority, without any protected political status.204 Separatist movements quickly gained
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traction throughout the early months of political independence. Local rebellion appeared to be
erupting everywhere, with insurgents skilled in guerilla tactics and thriving on illegal economic
and political activities. By 1949, 75 percent of the towns in Myanmar had fallen to one insurgent
group or another.205 While insurgency blossomed, the weak central government in Rangoon
struggled to collect revenue and to organize the Tatmadaw.206 The disorganized national military
was barely distinguishable from the dizzying array of quasi-state and private armies, and the
Tatmadaw struggled to wage coherent campaigns against the growing separatist movements.207
As Callahan writes, “just as the state became independent from colonial rule, it utterly
collapsed.”208

Military-Led State-Building
The state in Myanmar was slowly established, with the national military at its forefront.
This statebuilding project was partly driven by the cross-border impacts of China’s civil war.
Following the Communist victory in Mainland China, the Chinese Nationalist Party,
(Kuomintang, KMT) was forced to flee. After the KMT was driven out of Yunnan, one of its last
strongholds, a section of the KMT crossed the border into Myanmar and occupied parts of the
Shan State.209 The presence of the KMT destabilized Myanmar’s borderland area for several
decades, posing a threat that demanded a reorganized national military, capable of defending
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national sovereignty.210 In order to protect Myanmar’s national sovereignty, the Tatmadaw
underwent a restructuring and reorganization process that strengthened the general staff and
limited the civilian oversight of elected politicians. Throughout this reorganization, military
authority was rapidly elevated—the military was delegated all power over anything remotely
defined as a security concern. In 1953, the “[T]atmadaw alone claimed responsibility for
defining who was an enemy of the state and deciding how enemies and threats would be
handled.”211 It was the army, rather than the civilian bureaucracy, that experimented with
counterinsurgent strategies. Ultimately, the presence of the KMT coincided with other factors to
support the overdevelopment of the Burmese military, relative to the weak civilian
government.212 As Myanmar’s military grew stronger, other branches of the government did not
follow suit.
Burmese statebuilding initially reflects Tilly’s classic logic—wartime competition over
territory facilitated state development by prompting the state to concentrate coercive power.213
However, no strong state ever emerged from the conflict with the KMT. As Centeno argues, state
making is not a benefit inherent to all wars.214 The European states that Tilly considered already
had a basic organizational capacity that allowed them to respond to war in a certain way and
construct a strong state. Myanmar—like the Latin American states studied by Centeno—severely
lacked this organizational capacity. Thus, Myanmar was unable to develop universally strong
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institutions and its statebuilding project was led by the military. As noted in the previous chapter,
the Japanese trained a military elite that fed directly into the post-war government.215
These elite had undergone rigorous military training but gained little experience with other
aspects of governance.
By singularly pursuing a military solution to its domestic problems, the Burmese
government crowded out other potential state reformers. Officers became state builders and the
military expanded from military-as-institution into military-as-state itself.216 Burmese citizens
and the civilian government became mere barriers to the Tatmadaw’s consolidation of political
power.217As Schwartz explains, the expansion of military control outside of non-military
institutional arenas obstructs internal regime opposition and civilian oversight. Instead, authority
becomes concentrated in a small body of military elites.218 While the central military grew
increasingly strong, the development of civil services and political parties was deeply stunted.
In post-independence Myanmar, “one limp structure lay in the civilian realm; the other, more
robust structure in the military bureaucracy.”219 In early independence, Myanmar never strayed
from its purely military approach to governance.220
In order to protect the military institution from destructive ethnic divisions, the
Tatmadaw was defined along ethnic lines. Initially, the Tatmadaw attempted to organize separate
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ethnic units, but this was short lived. In 1949, several ethnic Karen units defected from the
Tatmadaw and joined the KNDO.221 The Tatmadaw’s “First Kachin Rifles” unit also revolted.222
These Karen and Kachin revolts prompted the army to quietly reorganize and place Burman
officers in charge of the reorganized Burman units.223 While the Tatmadaw was not as explicit in
its ethnic exclusion as the colonial military, it was fundamentally controlled and staffed by ethnic
Burmans. Furthermore, the Tatmadaw implemented policies that were intended to ensure the
Burmanization of its new officers. By 1951, the military adapted Burmese to code for use in
signaling.224 Two years later, the Defense Services Academy Bill was passed, which created an
officer’s training college for the purpose of “eliminat[ing] any tendency toward minority disunity
in ideological concept among the Armed Forces and thus to ensure the enduring security of the
Constitution.”225 The training college was also linked to the University of Rangoon where the
curriculum was focused on the culture and history of ethnic Burmans. By largely excluding
ethnic minorities and attempting to “Burmanize” all new officers, independent Myanmar
established a national military that—like the military institutions under the British and
Japanese—was defined along ethnic lines.
Myanmar’s early independence period is deeply reflective of the colonial and imperial
states. Conflict erupted along the same divisions politicized and militarized by the British and
Japanese. With a weak central state, Myanmar governed through its national military, which
came quickly to be an ethnically exclusive institution controlled by the Burman majority. This
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ethnically exclusive military institution would continue to reinforce the “otherness” of ethnic
minority groups, thus undermining ethnic unity in Myanmar. As the Burmese state took form,
institutionalizing exclusive nationalism, ethnic insurgency simultaneously erupted.

Emerging Insurgency
Within the first 15 years of independence, the Karens, Mons, and Kachins had all taken
up arms against the central state. These three groups did not rebel at precisely the same moment,
however. The behavior of each group was influenced by its distinct experience under the British
and the Japanese.
The Karen people were the first to establish an ethnic armed organization. It is not
surprising that the Karens would rebel immediately against the independent Burman government,
given Karen history. As early as the pre-colonial period, Karens suffered greatly at the hands of
the Burmans and were subjected to raids and forced into labor.226 Under the British, the ethnic
violence between the Karens and Burmans subsided, as the two groups were sharply divided
within the colonial apparatus, and the Karens were given privileged treatment. After the Japanese
occupied Myanmar and allied with the Burmans, violence between the Karens and Burmans
resumed immediately, and the Burman BIA committed many atrocities against the pro-British
Karens.
Shortly before independence, in 1947, the Karen National Union (KNU) was established
by several hundred Karen representatives with the goal of achieving a separate Karen state that
remained within the British Commonwealth. Later that year, the KNU formed its own militia, the
Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO). The KNU was the most prominent ethno-
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separatist movement during this period.227 The KNU and KNDO were both headquartered in
Sanchaung, a Rangoon suburb, and publicly carried out drills, in uniform, in front of their
office.228 These activities are notedly similar to those conducted by the tats (or political pocket
armies) that existed in the colonial state, as described in Chapter Two. The emergence of
colonial tats—which were fundamentally ethnically based, local militia—resulted directly from
ethnically exclusive policies of the colonial government. Post-independence, the emergence of
ethnically defined insurgent armies under Burman dominated government clearly parallels the
dynamics under the colonial state.
The mutual mistrust and conflict between the Burmans and the Karens, so vastly
amplified by the colonial and imperial experiences, exploded in the early independence period.
During World War II, many Karens were armed by the British in order to fight against the
Japanese. Following the war, thousands of Karens still held these weapons, with no intentions of
giving them up. In June 1947, Karen leader Saw Marshall Shwin wrote: “with the painful
memories of Myaungma and Papun atrocities and other Burmese persecutions first in mind [the
Karens] are not going to give up any arms for any pretext whatsoever.”229 The Karens directly
cited past Burman attacks as reason for remaining armed. The explosive violence between the
Karens and the Tatmadaw only continued to escalate after independence. In December of 1948,
members of the Burman military police went on a murderous rampage the Palaw area, near a
Karen stronghold. On Christmas Eve, more than eighty Karens—men, women, and children—
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were killed while attending church services.230 With powerful grievances held against the
Burman population, and aspirations of a separate state, the immediate Karen rebellion is highly
consistent with their behavior and experiences. The Karens have been locked into conflict with
the ethnically exclusive national army since its inception under the Japanese. The BIA was
reformulated into the Tatmadaw, and the institutional continuity of the Burmese military
sustained the conflict between the Burmans and the Karens, driving ethnic insurgency.
While the Karen rebellion might be logically anticipated, the sudden Mon rebellion
appears quite unexpected and inconsistent with their past behavior. During the colonial period
and the Japanese occupation, the Mons held a seemingly unpoliticized identity. Under British
and Japanese institutions, which sharply distinguished between ethnic minorities and the
majority group, the Mons were caught in the middle. As a small group dispersed among the
Burman population, the Mon were in political limbo. In the colonial state, the British sometimes
treated Mons as Burmans, but at other times distinguished the Mons from the Burmans. Under
the British, the Mons received no political benefits from their minority status, unlike the Karens
and Kachins. Thus, it is important to recognize that the Burman nationalist movement and the
Japanese occupation appeared initially advantageous to the Mons. Since the Burmans considered
the Mons to be part of the ethnic majority group, the elevation of Burman political status directly
benefited the Mons. There were even Mons who took on major roles in the nationalist
movement. However, once the independent state began to take form, this association with the
ethnic majority was no longer advantageous. After decades of assimilation, the Mons still
retained a separate culture and identity, but the Burmans refused to acknowledge this cultural
distinctness. While the Mons wished to assert their ethnic identity, they were excluded from the
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Panglong Agreement. After decades caught in political limbo, the Mons were fed up; they
entered into the early independence period entirely disillusioned with the emerging Burman
government.
After decades of assimilation to the majority, scattered groups of Mon began to arm
themselves almost immediately following independence, asserting a separatist claim to a Mon
state. By 1953, scattered armed groups were gradually assimilated into one group, the Mon
People’s Front (MPF).231 The MPF took up arms against the government and Tatmadaw and
established ‘liberated zones’ in the eastern hills of the state, from where they hoped to achieve
independence, or at least substantial autonomy.232 The Mon rebelled against the very nationalist
leaders that they had collaborated with. A statement issued by the New Mon State Party (a
successful outgrowth of the MPF) in the 1980s lends clarity to the Mon rebellion.
Through several facts and figures and bitter experiences for years, Mons have learnt
better lessons. [The realized] that they can not rely on any alien people and must have
their own struggle programme. Therefore, to guide of their national movement, they …
[must] have an association of their own.233
As the Burmese state took shape, it was being strong articulated in ethnic terms unfavorable to
the Mon. The Burman government insinuated that the Mons and Burmans were
“indistinguishable in racial identity and characteristics, and so separate minority rights should
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not be contemplated”234 The Mons had learned that they could not trust the Burmans and refused
to continue collaborating with the government. This distrust precipitated decades of destructive
ethnic violence and insurgency.
Unlike the Karen and Mon, the Kachin did not immediately rebel after Myanmar gained
political independence. Two key factors delayed Kachin rebellion. Firstly, the borderland Kachin
territories did not immediately feel the pressures of the central state, because the government was
focused elsewhere. In the early years of independence, the Burmese government was struggling
to establish a functioning state in Rangoon. Simultaneously, the security threat posed by the
KMT diverted the government’s attention. Rather than emphasizing the political incorporation of
the Kachin territories, the state was focused on fighting the KMT in the neighboring Shan
territories. By March 1953, it was estimated that 80% of the Burmese military was engaged in
fighting the KMT.235 Put simply, the government was preoccupied. Thus, it seems likely that the
Kachins did not immediately feel the impacts of Burman rule.
The second factor that delayed rebellion was the relative trust that the Kachins appeared
to have in the central state.236 The Kachin were allotted significant political autonomy under
British rule, and the Japanese were unable to conquer their borderland territory. Prior to
independence, the Kachin, unlike the Karen, had never come directly into conflict with the
Burman majority. While they fought on opposite sides of World War II, the Kachins fought
against Japanese troops and not against the BIA. The institutional continuity of the Burmese
military—the obvious transformation of the BIA into the Tatmadaw—severely undermined the
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possibility of Karen negotiations with the government. However, the Kachins did not share the
same experience with Myanmar’s military institution. This lack of direct conflict with the BIA
(and thus, lack of ethnic violence between the Burmans and Kachins) seems to have made the
Kachin more willing negotiators with the emerging state. Or perhaps, conversely, this made the
state more willing to negotiate with the Kachin. Of the three groups studied in this paper, the
Kachin were the only group to sign the Panglong Agreement, which promised them eventual
freedom as an ethnic state.237 The Panglong Agreement played a major role in delaying Kachin
rebellion, for the Kachin leaders adhered to the agreement for over a decade, anticipating an
autonomous ethnic state.
As the Burmese state continued to centralize and enact policy that was favorable to the
majority, it became clear there were no intentions of honoring the Panglong Agreement.
In 1960, U Nu made a public promise to make Buddhism the state religion, which angered the
Kachin people, who were still majority Christian. 238 Around the same time, China and Myanmar
also finalized border demarcation negotiations, which saw three Kachin villages given to China.
This stoked rumors that the central government of Myanmar had given vast tracts of Kachin land
to China.239Abandoning the Panglong Agreement at last, the Kachin took up arms and began the
fight for freedom. In 1961, the Kachin founded the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which
would ultimately become one of the largest and best organized armed groups in Myanmar.240
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The Karen, Mon, and Kachin insurgencies did not begin at the same moment. However,
this variance at the outset of insurgency does not undermine my argument in chapters two and
three; this variance is best explained by the distinct experiences of minority groups under the
British and the Japanese. The conflict between the Karens and Burmans was amplified by the
divisive institutions built by the British and Japanese, and reached a head in the early
independence period. After decades caught in political limbo, the Mons refused to continue
collaborating with an ethnic majority that denied their ethnic identity. Both the Karens and Mons
entered into the independence period entirely disillusioned and distrusting of the Burman
majority government. The Kachins, however, had always enjoyed a degree of separation from
the central state. While British and Japanese era institutions made Kachin identity deeply
political, the Kachins had no real history of ethnic conflict with the Burman majority. Thus,
Kachins were able to negotiate with the Burman government in relatively good faith. Kachin
insurgency did not erupt until a decade after independence, after the central state had clearly
failed them. Ultimately, the emergence of Karen, Mon, and Kachin insurgencies reflect their
experiences with British and Japanese era institutions.

Ethnic Politics and Insurgency Over Time
British and Japanese legacies precipitated ethnic insurgency and shaped the distinct
behaviors of the Karen, Kachin, and Mon. Yet over 70 years have passed since Myanmar gained
political independence; we should not assume that wartime and colonial era legacies of conflict
will persist. Staniland argues that the goals of the postcolonial regime play a key role in defining
and fueling insurgency and shaping the arc of conflict. In order to accurately analyze
contemporary conflict dynamics, it is important to understand the ideology of the modern
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Burmese state. What quickly becomes apparent, however, is that Myanmar’s national ideology is
deeply rooted in its colonial past. The institutional roots of the military—in the 1930s nationalist
movement and 1940s BIA—instilled in the Burman government a deep distrust of ethnic
minorities and a fear of losing power to these groups.241 Since independence, the Burmese
nationalist project, which first emerged under the British and was strengthened by the Japanese,
has laid a foundation for ongoing political conflict.
After independence, ethnically exclusive nationalist ideology manifested in an expansive
project of forced assimilation, or Burmanization. After Ne Win staged a coup d’état in 1962,
regaining power, he quickly began implementing new reforms. Ne Win was first asked to serve
as Prime Minister of Myanmar in 1968, after the former prime minister failed to suppress the
ethnic insurgencies that were wreaking havoc on the state. Though Ne Win stepped down in
1960, he seized power just two years later. Ne Win quickly dissolved the legislature and
established the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, drawing members almost entirely
from the military.242 Ne Win rapidly began implementing new reforms to “safeguard” the united
nation-state. This meant suppressing the ethno-cultural “other” and imposing one language:
Burmese, one religion: Buddhism, one ethnicity: Burman.243
In 1962, Burmese was established as the national language, and the usage of other ethnic
languages was banned in newspapers, books, and other mediums. Schools were also
nationalized, and while the teaching of most minority languages was still allowed, Burmese was
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promoted as the sole medium of instruction.244 The growing influence of the central state and its
Burmanizing agenda is particularly apparent in the case of the Kachin. The Kachin had long
enjoyed a state of autonomy, or at the very least, a degree of removal from the politics in the
central state. Yet they were increasingly subject to the power of the central government. The
teaching of Kachin language was even banned in public schools.
General Ne Win also denied the need for a separate Mon culture and ethnicity, shortly
after seizing power. According to Ne Win, “the Mon tradition had been fully incorporated into
Burmese national culture, and thus required no distinct expression.”245 Just as Burmanization
ultimately amplified ethnic divisions, the state’s rejection of Mon identity only drew greater
attention to the distinctness of Mon identity. The manner in which “ordinary” Mon people have
responded to the nationalist agenda is often unclear, as the majority are poor rice farmers focused
on their day-to-day survival (the same could be said of most ethnic minority groups in
Myanmar). The government has insisted that a separate Mon identity is redundant, but its
policies have continued to cultivate the notion of a distinct Mon identity. The harsh treatment of
the Mon has led to an increased dependency on Mon militias for basic security, which has
amplified support for ethnic armed organizations and reinforced public identification with Mon
ethnicity.246 Notably, Burmanization efforts have explicitly targeted the Kachins and Mons more
frequently than the Karens—perhaps by the 1960s, the Karens were considered a lost cause, too
deeply entrenched in centuries of conflict with the Burmans.
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The government in Rangoon continually strives to Burmanize its diverse population
through the revival and propagation of a Burman national culture.247 Since the early 1990s,
museums have been built throughout Myanmar, intended to institutionalize and reproduce the
“national culture.”248 While these policies were intended to promote national unity, they have
continuously heightened ethno-cultural awareness among minority groups.249 Burmanization
policies have amplified ideas of an “us versus them,” deepening and reinforcing the divisions
between the Burmans and the ethnic minority groups. The attempt to eradicate diversity in
Myanmar has had the unintentional effect of ensuring that minority identity has been largely
defined in opposition to the ethnic majority.
The Burmese government has continued to sustain the ethnic conflict in Myanmar and
reinforce divisions among its population. The ideological foundation of the postcolonial regime
is deeply grounded in ethno-nationalism, making the state deeply suspicious of ethnic minority
groups. After colonial and imperial ethnic divisions were transmitted into the early independence
period, today, ethnically exclusive nationalist ideology continues to lay a foundation for conflict.
In his study of Myanmar, Staniland does not explicitly focus on colonial legacies; instead, his
argument emphasizes the goals and ideology of the postcolonial regime and the role these
features play in shaping insurgency. Yet, this appears to be a superficial distinction. The goals of
the modern Burmese state are fundamentally rooted in ethno-nationalism that was distinctly
shaped by British and Japanese institutions. On a surface level, Staniland shifts attention away
from the colonial period, yet his argument returns to colonial legacies, nonetheless. He writes
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that Burmese nationalism has had an “overriding focus on overcoming colonial humiliation and
restoring the majority population to its rightful place.”250 While postcolonial regimes might
reshape conflict dynamics in the pursuit of their own interests and ideological goals, the state in
Myanmar has continued to sustain wartime and colonial era legacies of conflict. Guided by a
fundamentally exclusive nationalist ideology, the modern state in Myanmar has been deeply
unwilling to accommodate ethnic minorities, and the ideological project of Burmanization
continues to generate revolt.251

Continued Insurgency, Ceasefire Politics, and Ethnic Defection
If deeply rooted ethno-nationalism is the fundamental driver of Myanmar’s ethnic
conflict, how then should we interpret the recent shift to ceasefire politics, and the varying
participation of ethnic minority groups in ceasefire agreements? In the following section, I
analyze the conflict and negotiation patterns of the Karen, Kachin, and Mon, and show that this
shift towards ceasefire politics is tactical, not fundamental. In each case, ethnic armed groups
have signed ceasefire agreements when they faced significant resource constraints or tactical
incentives. Overwhelmingly, war weariness and increased military pressures have forced ethnic
insurgents to sign ceasefire agreements. There has been no fundamental rethinking of Burmese
nationalism or willingness to recognize Myanmar’s multicultural and multiracial identity.
Ceasefire agreements do not represent any change to Myanmar’s ethno-nationalism, or any shift
in minority identity. Instead, ceasefire politics has been a superficial and short lived “solution” to
ethnic conflict.
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The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its armed wing, the Kachin
Independence Army (KIA) effectively controlled the Kachin State from the 1960s until a 1994
ceasefire—it seems quite strange that such a robust insurgency would suddenly suspend its fight
and stay largely dormant until 2011.252 However, tactical incentives compelled the KIO to sign a
ceasefire. After three decades of exhausting conflict, the KIO was increasingly outgunned by the
central government. While the Kachin did have a powerful geographic stronghold, the
distribution of their territory rendered it difficult to build a secure infrastructure without crossing
government territory. The Kachin insurgency seemed to grow increasingly hopeless, and it was
this war weariness that precipitated their ceasefire.253
Despite a nearly two-decade ceasefire, the KIA renewed its activities in 2011 and quickly
regained momentum. It is clear that the previous ceasefire agreement was not representative of
any fundamental shift in Kachin identity or politics; in fact, more and more Kachin youth are
supporting the KIA and its means of seeking Kachin independence. This likely reflects the fact
that many Kachin people felt increasingly marginalized throughout the early 21st century, as
economic changes in the name of development led to the exploitation of the natural resources
found in Kachin territory.254 While not the focus of this thesis, KIO violence also escalated
following the 2021 military coup.
Similar to the Kachin, tactical incentives drove Mon insurgents to sign a ceasefire
agreement in 1995. Unlike the Karen and Kachin insurgencies, the Mon have no borderland
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territories to which they can retreat.255 This geographic constraint, as well as the relatively small
size of the Mon population, gradually weakened the New Mon State Party's military position
over decades of fighting. Offensives by the Burmese army forced the NMSP to slowly retreat
and ultimately sign a ceasefire agreement. From the perspective of the central state, the ceasefire
agreement has been somewhat successful, in the sense that the NMSP’s levels of violence have
been low. However, this low level of insurgent activity is reflective of the very constraints that
have long inhibited the collective action of the Mon people. Throughout Burmese history, the
political experience of Mons has been defined by their unfortunate position as a small ethnic
minority group distributed geographically across the majority population. It is logical that Mon
insurgents have struggled the most in their fight against the central state. The lastingness of the
Mon ceasefire is, once again, not representative of meaningful identity shift. The Mons continue
pursue autonomy through the legal fold, though the state still refuses to acknowledge their ethnic
identity.256
In Myanmar’s civil conflict, the violence between the Karen and ethnic Burmans is the
longest running. Unlike the Kachin and Mon insurgents, the Karen National Union (KNU) did
not sign a ceasefire agreement until 2012. The KNU and its armed wing, the Karen National
Liberation Army (KNLA), continues insurgent activities as the oldest armed insurgent group in
Myanmar.257 While it is difficult to calculate an official estimate—and the KNU has likely
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shrunk in the past decade—it once boasted an army of 14,000 men. The KNU has also
controlled a large amount of territory along Myanmar’s eastern border.258
Two main factors deterred the KNU from signing a ceasefire agreement at an earlier date.
Firstly, the KNU was well established after fighting for over 60 years. They provided basic
administration in controlled areas, with established hospitals, clinics, high schools, and hundreds
of village schools. This power made the KNU less inclined to sign a ceasefire, as they were not
facing the same constraints as the Kachin and Mon.259 Second, the Karen had a very welldeveloped political ideology that was founded in a deep mistrust of the central state.260 The four
guiding principles of the KNU had built-in barriers to a ceasefire:
Surrender is out of the question; the recognition of the Karen State must be completed;
the KNU shall retain its arms; the Karen shall decide their own political destiny.261
The legacy of distrust between the KNU and the central government rendered a ceasefire very
difficult. The BIA massacres in Karen villages were associated with the central government and
the Tatmadaw. The institutional continuity of the military, and its powerful role in the
government, sustained insurgency, keeping the Karens and Burmans locked in ethnic conflict.262
However, even the powerful KNU was ultimately worn down, signing a ceasefire in 2012.
Almost a decade later, this ceasefire was rendered meaningless by the February 2021 military
coup.
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In the past three decades, there have been notable shifts to ceasefire politics. However,
this shift is ultimately reflective of war weariness and the different constraints limiting insurgent
groups, rather than a fundamental change to the dynamics of ethnic conflict, or a fluid and
evolving expression of ethnic identity. It is important to note, however, that there has been
minimal ethnic defection in Myanmar. Kalyvas defines ethnic defection as “a process whereby
individuals join organizations explicitly opposed to the national aspirations with which they
identify and end up fighting against their coethnics.”263 In Myanmar, as in any civil conflict,
there have been divisions within organizations: rifts over different ideological goals and
competing strategies. Some of these divisions have resulted in the fragmentation of insurgent
groups, and some of these splinter groups have been repurposed by the Tatmadaw as pro-state
militias, supplying local information and manpower.
In 2009, Myanmar implemented the Border Guard Force (BGF) scheme to incorporate
former ethnic insurgents into the Tatmadaw structure.264 The BGF has faced significant
difficulty: not all ceasefire signatories accepted the program, and many perceived it as an effort
to dismantle their forces.265 However, some small splinter groups have been successfully
incorporated through the BGF. Kalyvas finds that territorial control is a major predictor of ethnic
defection—the higher the level of territorial control exercised by the “enemy” in a given locality,
the more ethnic defection is observed.266 In Myanmar, this theory wrongly predicts that the Mons
would be most likely to experience ethnic defection, as they have no geographic stronghold and
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live within territory controlled by Burmans. Yet when the NMSP signed a ceasefire, it refused to
relinquish control over its forces and integrate into the BGF. Instead, Karen and Kachin splinter
groups have been incorporated into the BGF, despite having more territorial control than the
Mons. Kalyvas’ findings fail to explain ethnic defection in Myanmar, revealing that territorial
control is not entirely predictive of ethnic defection. More importantly, however, I argue that
limited ethnic defection is not representative of any meaningful change in Myanmar’s ethnic
conflict. Kalyvas remarks that the recruitment of ethnic defectors is “a testament to the fluidity of
ethnic boundaries.”267 Yet Myanmar’s ethnic boundaries have not really shifted or changed.
Despite limited ethnic defection, Kachin and Karen groups remain firmly locked in
conflict with the central state. Kalyvas stresses that the process of ethnic defection is “extremely
consequential even when the numbers of defectors remain relatively small” because ethnic
identity ceases to be a reliable indicator of rebel behavior.268 In Myanmar, ethnic identity has
been a powerful indicator of political and violent behavior since independence in 1948—this is
far from changing. The BGF program was implemented in 2009. Aside from the incorporation of
small splinter groups, this program has not driven any meaningful shift in ethnic politics, and
ethnic identity remains a reliable indicator of rebel behavior. Kachin, Karen, and Mon
organizations continually assert their desires for ethnic autonomy, with widespread support from
their respective groups. Burmese ethno-nationalism sustains this insurgency: Burmanization
policies amplify “otherness,” the military pushes for a unitary, nonfederal state, and commits
extremely high levels of violence in ongoing conflicts.269 Ultimately, we observe little of the
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fluidity anticipated by constructivist insights. As Staniland writes, “there has not been a
transformational change in the core political cleavages.”270 Violent conflict still erupts along the
ethnic cleavages politicized by British and Japanese era institutions.
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Chapter Five: Striking Continuity and Enduring Ethnic Conflict
Introduction
British and Japanese era institutions created lasting fault lines of conflict, dividing
Myanmar’s diverse society, and reproducing patterns of ethnic violence between the military and
minority groups. Prior to colonization, ethnicity was highly textured and elastic, defined in
regional and linguistic terms. Ethnic identity was not made highly political until the British
colonial state stratified the Burmese population along ethnic lines. By selectively incorporating
Karens and Kachins into the colonial military, and bestowing political privileges upon them, the
British elevated the status of ethnic minority groups. The Burman majority was simultaneously
excluded from the military and underrepresented politically, spurring an ethno-nationalist
movement that drew a sharp line between “collaborators” and Burman nationalists. Under the
colonial state, the primacy of coercive force, rising ethnic tensions, and anti-British nationalist
sentiment primed society for Japanese militarism. The Japanese captured the momentum of the
Burman nationalists to overthrow the British and establish Myanmar’s first national army.
In founding the Burman Independence Army, the Japanese unknowingly created an institution
that would quickly emerge as the nucleus of the post-independence government. The BIA
evolved almost directly into the Tatmadaw: this institutional continuity preserved ethnonationalist ideology and ethnic fault lines of conflict between the Burmans and ethnic minority
groups. While British institutions made ethnicity fundamentally political, Japanese military
institutions ensured that colonial era ethnic cleavages were transmitted into the postcolonial
independent state.
Since independence, the Karens, Kachins and Mons have continued to assert violent
separatist claims against the central state. Though we observe a distinct shift to ceasefire politics
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in the 1990s, this was not precipitated by changing dynamics of ethnic conflict. Closer analysis
reveals that tactical difficulties and war weariness were the primary factors contributing to the
signature of ceasefire agreements. Weakened insurgent groups cooperated with the central state
out of desperation and this cooperation did not last, as both the Karen and Kachin resumed
hostilities despite their ceasefire agreements. The political and ethnic cleavages that drive
modern ethnic conflict trace clearly to British and Japanese era institutions. The Burmese state is
gripped by ethno-nationalism that sustains a self-reproductive cycle of violence.
This thesis tested three different hypotheses. First, I considered hypothesis 1: British
colonialism established “fault lines” of conflict, determining the course of ethnic conflict in
Myanmar. My findings support this hypothesis—the colonial period was institutionally
transformative, establishing ethnic identity as the foundation of political and military
mobilization. However, these fault lines of conflict would not have been so durable without the
reinforcement of Japanese institutions. My analysis shows that the Japanese occupation during
World War II did not overwrite the British colonial legacy. Thus, I reject my second hypothesis:
massive wartime disruption replaced colonial institutions, casting new legacies which better
explain Myanmar’s ethnic conflict. The British and Japanese legacies coincided almost perfectly;
the Japanese harnessed an ethno-nationalist movement to serve their own wartime imperatives,
while the British took advantage of insecure and hopeful minority groups. Wartime institution
building reinforced the ethnic demarcation between nationalists and colonial collaborators,
amplifying mistrust and resentment in Myanmar’s divided population.271 It is impossible to
entirely disentangle the legacies of the British and the Japanese, as the Japanese occupation
preserved colonial era dynamics and deepened ethnic cleavages. As noted in Chapter Two, this
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finding should be investigated in further research. Under what conditions does war scramble
ethnic identities, and when does it reproduce them? Is Myanmar unique in this regard, or does
this reflect a general trend?
My findings also contradict hypothesis 3: ethnic conflict in Myanmar has not been
determined by institutional legacies; political and social factors have shaped the behaviors of
conflict actors, driving the evolution of ethnic conflict. While non-institutional factors have
certainly influenced the behaviors of conflict actors, the modern Burmese state is still defined by
British and Japanese era institutions—most importantly, the military. The ethnically exclusive
Tatmadaw is a shockingly powerful institution that controls the state, dictates an ethnonationalist agenda, and fuels conflict. The militarization of Myanmar can clearly be traced to the
legacies of the British and Japanese, which coincided to elevate the role of the military above all
other institutions of governance.
Each of these three hypotheses failed to entirely predict the institutional determinants of
Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, and its remarkable continuity. Though my first hypothesis most
closely resembles my findings in this project, it still fails to capture and incorporate the
significance of the Japanese occupation during World War II. Together, the British and Japanese
periods established an institutional trajectory that has produced disastrous long-term
consequences.

Continuity in Conflict
The central finding of this project is that Myanmar’s ethnic conflict has major elements
of continuity. From the colonial era to World War II, to modern day, conflict has been
reproduced along the same ethnic divides. Each iteration of the Burmese military—the colonial
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military, the BIA, and the Tatmadaw—has been an ethnically exclusive institution with elevated
oversight and striking supremacy. Ethnic identity has continued to serve as a yardstick for
political power, and the basis for competition over influence, leadership, and autonomy.272 As a
result, Burman, Kachin, Karen and Mon identities remain extremely politically salient.
“Change is synonymous with war,” Kalyvas writes.273 Yet this pithy observation does not
ring true in the case of Myanmar. My findings raise a significant question: why has Myanmar
had so much continuity in its ethnic conflict? Why do I observe so little fluidity, despite
Kalyvas’ theoretical and empirical predictions? First, it is important to recognize the limits of
Kalyvas’ findings: the bulk of his analysis is focused on one province in a single country—
Argolid, in southern Greece—and therefore his theory of ethnic defection must be treated as
suggestive.274 While territorial control was highly predictive of ethnic defection in Argolid, it
does not accurately predict ethnic defection in Myanmar. Further research could examine why
territorial control is not a significant determinant of ethnic defection in Myanmar. Based on my
overall findings, I anticipate that ideology and institutional legacies play a key role in
determining ethnic conflict, in addition to resource constraints. While many ethnic groups,
including the New Mon State Party, signed ceasefire agreements, only certain splinter groups are
willing to cooperate with such a deeply exclusionary ethnocratic state. Should this prove true,
Kalyvas’ theory of ethnic defection might be adapted.
My analysis of Myanmar also suggests that varying expressions of ethnic identity, as in
ethnic defection, do not necessarily represent a fundamental change in an ongoing ethnic
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conflict. Despite the ethnic defection of splinter groups, Myanmar’s ethnic minorities remain
locked in conflict with the central state. As seen in Myanmar, when institutions reinforce conflict
over many decades, patterns of violence become highly durable.275 Limited instances of ethnic
defection are less meaningful, and less predictive of ethnic behaviors. Essentially, the
significance of ethnic defection is entirely overwhelmed by more powerful institutions that
reinforce ethnic identity and preserve fault lines of conflict. My findings suggest that when
ethnic defection occurs late in an already durable ethnic conflict, this variance in the behavioral
expression of ethnic identity does not necessarily undermine the significance of institutional
legacies or fundamentally alter conflict dynamics. This is an expansive area for further research,
with major implications for the prediction of ethnic conflict. When does ethnic defection
precipitate greater fluidity in the behavioral expression of ethnic identity? Is there something
distinct about Myanmar’s ethnic conflict, or might this finding be generalizable in similar cases?
Myanmar represents a case of extremely durable ethnic conflict that traces directly back to
colonial legacies—a valuable case study for comparison with other postcolonial regimes.

Looking to the Future
The weight of history constricts Myanmar’s political future; recent developments only
reaffirm this finding. The brutal ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya, beginning in August 2017,
serves as a grim example of the state’s unwillingness to recognize the political status of minority
groups. The central state refuses to accept the multi-ethnic and multi-racial identities of its
populace and perpetuates “otherness” through policies of forced assimilation and horrific,
discriminate violence. The ethno-nationalist government and Tatmadaw continue to reinforce
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ethnic divisions in Myanmar, reinforcing patterns of conflict along colonial and imperial fault
lines. The ideological goals of the postcolonial regime help us to understand why the
breakthrough into cease-fire politics has not been followed by the widespread incorporation of
insurgent groups, and why the Karen National Union and Kachin Independence Army have
continued to fight against the state despite previous ceasefire agreements.276
The striking continuity of Myanmar’s ethnic conflict is further illustrated in the 2021
military coup and its aftermath. Last February, the Burman majority Tatmadaw demonstrated its
ultimate supremacy, seizing power in the dead of night and putting a firm end to Myanmar’s
recent period of quasi-democracy. Following the coup, violent crackdowns increased armed
resistance, particularly among the Karens and Kachins. In response, the military has brutally
targeted civilian populations through airstrikes, mass killings, and arrests.277 This state violence
only escalates insurgent violence, and every revolt deepens colonial fault lines of conflict. British
and Japanese era legacies created an insidious and enduring military institution that locks the
state in ethnic violence. The potential for ongoing conflict will remain ever present unless there
is a fundamental rethinking of Myanmar’s national identity.278
Myanmar’s historical institutions created a path-dependent, self-perpetuating ethnic
conflict. The parallels between the colonial period, the Japanese occupation, and the 21st century
are unmistakable—the state is ruled by coercive force, the population is divided along ethnic
lines, and political power is defined in ethnic terms. Conflict in Myanmar is far from fluid: the
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state continues along a disastrous institutional trajectory that reinforces ethnic conflict, without
an end in sight.

105
Bibliography
Allen, Louis. “Review of Japanese Military Rule in Burma, by Tsunezo Ota.” Modern Asian
Studies 3, no. 2 (1969): 177-81, http://www.jstor.org/stable/311859, 30.
Arthur, Brian. Increasing Returns and path Dependence in the Economy Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1994.
Aung-Thwin, Michael. Colonial Officials and Scholars: The Institutionalization of the Mon
Paradigm. In The Mists of Ramanna: The Legend That Was Lower Burma (pp. 281–298).
2005. University of Hawai’i Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1wn0qs1.15
Border, Jake. “The Movements of Mon National Liberation Army”, in Soldier of Fortune.
(1987). Bertil Lintner Collection of Burmese documents, University of Washington.
Bigagli, Francesco. “School, Ethnicity and Nation-Building in Post-Colonial Myanmar.”
Research in Educational Policy and Management 1, no. 1 (December 16, 2019): 1–16.
https://doi.org/10.46303/repam.01.01.1.
Buchanan, John. Militias in Myanmar. Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2016.
Cady, John F. A History of Modern Burma. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
Callahan, Mary. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press,
2002.
Centeno, Miguel Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003.
Cheesman, Nick. “School, State and Sangha in Burma.” Comparative Education 39, no 1 (2003):
45-63.
Dukalskis, Alexander. “Why Do Some Insurgent Groups Agree to Cease-Fires While Others Do
Not? A Within-Case Anlysis of Burma/Myanmar, 1948-2011.” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism 38, no. 10. (2015): 21.
Furnivall, J.S. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands
India. New York: New York University Press, 1956.
Gravers, Mikael. Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma. Copenhagen: NIAS, 2010.
Han, Enze. Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland State Building between China and Southeast
Asia. Oxford University Press, 2019.

106
Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A
Research Agenda.” Perspectives on Politics 2, no. 04 (2004): 725-40.
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592704040472.
Herbst, Jeffrey. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Jansen, Jan C. and Jurgen Osterhammel. Decolonization: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2017.
Schneider, Leander. “Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Authoritarianism in Tanzania:
Connects and Disconnects.” African Studies Review 49, no 1 (2006): 93-118.
Keck, Stephen L. British Burma in the New Century, 1895-1918. London: Palgrave Macmillan
UK, 2015.
Kohli, Atul. “Chapter Four. Where Do High-Growth Political Economies Come From? The
Japanese Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State.’” The Developmental State, 2019.
Kim, Diana. Empires of Vice: The Rise of Opium Prohibition across Southeast Asia. Princeton
University Press, 2020. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvp7d4p6.
Lange, Matthew. Lineages of Despotism and Development: British Colonialism and State Power.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
Lebra, Joyce. Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia: Independence and Volunteer Forces
in World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
Leonard, Karen. “Reassessing Indirect Rule in Hyderabad: Rule, Ruler, or Sons-in-Law of the
State?” 2003.
Lieberman, Evan S., and Prerna Singh. “Census Enumeration and Group Conflict: A Global
Analysis of the Consequences of Counting.” World Politics 69, no. 1 (2017): 1–53.
doi:10.1017/S0043887116000198.
Lieberman, Victor B. “Ethnic Politics in Eighteenth-Century Burma.” Modern Asian Studies 12,
no. 3 (1978): 455-82.
Lieberman, Victor. Review of Excising the “Mon Paradigm” from Burmese Historiography, by
Michael A. Aung-Thwin. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2007): 377–83.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20071838.
Lintner, Bertil. Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 8, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.

107
Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late
Colonialism. Princeton: University Press, 1996.
Mathieson, David. “Bridging the 'Burma Gap' in Conflict Studies.” Tea Circle, May 22, 2018.
https://teacircleoxford.com/2018/05/07/bridging-the-burma-gap-in-conflict-studies/.
Moscotti, Albert D. British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1931-1937. Hawaii:
University of Hawaii Press, 1974.
“Myanmar's Coup: A Year under Military Rule in Numbers.” The Guardian. Guardian News and
Media, February 1, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2022/feb/01/myanmar-coup-a-year-under-military-rule-in-numbers.
“New Mon State Party 3rd ed.” Bertil Lintner Collection of Burmese documents, University of
Washington.
Priamarizki, Adhi. “Ka Kwe Ke to Border Guard Force: Proxy of Violence in Myanmar.”
Ritsumeikan University: Institute of International Relations and Area Studies, 2020.
Robinson, James. “States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay.” Journal of
Economic Literature 40, no. 2 (2002): 510–19.
https://doi.org/10.1257/002205102320161357.
Schwartz, Rachel. “Civil War, Institutional Change, and the Criminalization of the State:
Evidence from Guatemala’s Conflict Archives.” Journal of Peace Research 55 no. 2
(2020): 222-235.
Sharma, Sourabh Jyoti. “Ethnicity And Insurgency in Myanmar: Profiling of Non-State
Insurgent Groups,” Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 18, no. 3 (2014): 150–68.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48505114.
Selth, Andrew “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945.” Modern Asian Studies, 20(3), 483–
507. http://www.jstor.org/stable/312534.
Scott, James George. “Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States.” Rangoon: Government
Printing, 1990.
Silverstein, Josef. Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1977.
Smith, Martin. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. Dhaka: The University Press,
1991.

108
Smith, Martin and Ashley South, Nai Kasuah Mon, Nai Banya Hogsar. “Reflections on the 1995
New Mon State Party Ceasefire.” Covenant Institute via Myanmar Information
Management Unit. (2020).
Smith, Martin. 62; ‘Report on the Rebellion in Burma’, Presented by Sec. of State for India to
Parliament, June 1931 (HMSO): 13-14.
South, Ashley. Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. London:
Routledge, 2005.
Staniland, Paul. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2014.
Staniland, Paul. Ordering Violence: Explaining Armed Group-State Relations from Conflict to
Cooperation. Ithaca New York: Cornell University Press, 2021.
Staniland, Paul. “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders.” Perspectives on Politics 10,
no. 2 (2012): 243-64.
Stathis Kalyvas. “Ethnic Defection in Civil War.” Comparative Political Studies, 41(8), 10431068, 2008.
Taylor, Robert H. The State in Myanmar. Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 2009.
Taylor, Robert H. “The Relationship Between Burmese Social Classes and British-Indian Policy
on the Behavior of the Burmese Political Elite, 1937-1942,” Dissertation Abstracts
International Section A: Humanities and Social Sciences, 35, no. 6.
Tilly, Charles. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making”. Formation of National
States in Western Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Verghese, Ajay. The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Violence in India. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2016.
Yoon, Won Z. “Military Expediency: A Determining Factor in the Japanese Policy Regarding
Burmese Independence.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (1978): 248–67.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20062727.

